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Abstract 
Self-esteem occupies an esteemed position in psychological research, but the self-
esteem scholarship has often raised more questions than it has answered. Recent alternative 
approaches to self-esteem have made decent strides in resolving the mixed findings abound in 
the literature, such as a call for greater focus on self-esteem’s functionality and domain-
specific components of self-esteem. However, the lack of a well-grounded, parsimonious 
theory of self-esteem has kept these proximate theories and findings disparate and our overall 
understanding of self-esteem incomplete. The current dissertation sought to address these 
issues by developing a model of self-esteem based on the evolutionarily driven sociometer 
and life history theories such that important, unanswered issues concerning self-esteem 
research might be parsimoniously addressed, including what domains should affect self-
esteem, how domains might be prioritized, and how our self-worth or value in those domains 
is managed. In particular, life history theory may answer these questions and also offer a way 
of mapping other classifications of life domains meaningfully according to two fundamental 
strategies, specifically mating versus somatic effort. According to the proposed model, life 
history determines the domains in life that a person may prioritize, and self-esteem hinges on 
his or her worth or value in those prioritized domains. The current dissertation also developed 
and tested a measure that specifies how people will respond to either low or high value in the 
domains they prioritize, which can resolve questions about when people will exert effort to 
self-enhance or self-protect, or reduce effort and devalue the domain. Two studies served as 
an introductory investigation of the theoretical propositions of the current work and the 
findings were discussed in light of the predictions made. Overall, the current research extends 
our understanding of self-esteem and provided some evidence for the ideas proposed. 
Possible improvements to the current investigation are suggested in the discussion. 
  
RUNNING HEAD: LIFE HISTORY AND SOCIOMETER MODEL OF SELF-ESTEEM 
3 
 
1. Introduction 
Research on self-esteem has evolved markedly over time. In its heyday, high self-
esteem was viewed as a panacea to life’s problems. Self-esteem, which refers to a person’s 
overall affective evaluation of oneself, appears correlated with many aspects of psychological 
well-being, such as happiness, life satisfaction, and depression (e.g., Cheng & Furnham, 
2003; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994; Branden, 1994), as well as various other social and 
behavioral outcomes, such as prosociality and addictions (e.g., Jones & Berglas, 1978; Juth, 
Smyth, & Santuzzi, 2008; Smelser, 1989). People also appear motivated to maintain a 
positively biased view of the self through self-serving behaviors (e.g., Alicke & Sedikides, 
2009; Epstein, 2003; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004; Tice, 1991; 
Wills, 1981). Taken together, these findings paint a convenient, coherent narrative that people 
have a fundamental need for self-esteem, and raising self-esteem can cause people to feel, 
perform, or live better. However, recent scrutiny has cast doubt on the validity of self-esteem 
and the conclusions drawn that people have a need to maintain self-esteem as an end in itself. 
In particular, stringent analyses have found self-esteem’s predictive effects to be overstated 
(e.g., Boden, Fergusson, & Horwood, 2008) or highly variable (e.g., Judge & Bono, 2001). 
Conclusions drawn from the findings have also been found to run counter to expectations. 
For instance, in contrast to the common social psychological expectation that high self-
esteem promotes better social adjustment (Fu, Padilla-Walker, & Brown, 2017; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979; Smelser, 1989), having an unwarrantedly positive view of oneself can instead 
lead to antisocial behaviors such as excessive self-aggrandizement, narcissism, and 
aggressiveness (Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 2003). 
These weak, mixed, and unexpected findings indicate that particular established views 
of self-esteem in the social psychological literature and self-esteem’s associations with 
various psychological and behavioral outcomes require reconsideration. Some self-esteem 
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researchers have called for a greater focus on the functional purpose of self-esteem, which 
addresses what self-esteem really is for (Kurzban & Atkipis, 2007; Tracy, Cheng, Robins, & 
Trzesniewski, 2009). From this perspective, people’s efforts to maintain self-esteem are not 
for the sake of feeling better about oneself per se, but instead to manage one’s actual worth 
by accomplishing important tasks that bring value to oneself and others (e.g., Sedikides & 
Gregg, 2008; Leary, 2005). Other researchers have called for more attention to be paid 
towards domain-specific facets of the self (e.g., Crocker, Luhtanen, Cooper, & Bouvrette, 
2003; Rosenberg, Schooler, Schoenbach, & Rosenberg, 1995; Marsh & O’Neill, 1984; 
Shavelson, Hubner, & Stanton, 1976) and, relatedly, emphasized that one’s self-esteem is 
contingent on one’s status in domains that are considered important to the self, instead of just 
any or all domains (Ferris, Lian, Brown, Pang, & Keeping, 2010; Harter & Marold, 1991). 
Although these efforts have improved our understanding of self-esteem and 
potentially speak to some of the mixed findings, they have often been carried out disparately 
and leave questions unanswered (cf., Martiny & Rubin, 2016). For instance, researchers 
focusing on the function and purpose of self-esteem address how self-esteem helps people 
track their progress towards achieving important life goals, but do not address the range of 
goals across various domains that underlie self-esteem. Conversely, researchers focusing on 
the underlying domains of self-esteem address the goals in life that are generally important to 
people, but do not address how self-esteem might facilitate the pursuit of goals in these 
domains. In addition, because current self-esteem research does not employ theoretical 
frameworks that tackle the domains in life at a fundamental, adaptive level, the domains that 
social psychologists often purport to underlie self-esteem also appear randomly chosen and 
developed unsystematically (cf., Kruger, Wang, & Wilke, 2007). The domain-focused 
approach to self-esteem research additionally makes the assertion that self-esteem is 
contingent on successes in life domains that are important to the self, but leaves an 
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explanatory vacuum on how the importance of these domains is calibrated and prioritized for 
each individual. Further questions also remain concerning people’s self-biased behaviors, 
whereby studies have identified self-enhancement, self-protection, and devaluation of 
threatening feedback as three ways that people can either raise or protect self-esteem (Alicke 
& Sedikies, 2009; Major & Schmader, 1998). However, the overgeneralization of reported 
efforts to “protect” self-esteem oversimplifies the relationship between self-esteem and these 
various psychological and behavioral outcomes (Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 
2005). Absent is a systematic method to predict when people will enact which type of 
strategic behavior and, just as importantly, a fundamental basis for and ultimate reasons why 
these behaviors are enacted. 
The research gaps left behind by these various approaches to self-esteem indicate that 
they elucidate proximate processes but do not venture deeply enough (Buss & Kenrick, 
1998). Without a fundamental explanation that can theoretically unify these disparate 
approaches, our understanding of the function of self-esteem as well as its dynamics with 
various psychological and behavioral outcomes remains incomplete. Evolutionary 
psychology, with its strong focus on the fundamental, adaptive reasons that underlie various 
psychological phenomena, lends a promising perspective that may simultaneously and 
parsimoniously address these various research gaps, thus providing a valuable contribution 
and extension to our knowledge of self-esteem (cf., Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995; 
Kavanagh, Robins, & Ellis, 2010; Kirkpatrick, Waugh, Valencia, & Webster, 2002; 
Kirkpatrick & Ellis, 2001). By looking at self-esteem, which has dominantly been in the 
purview of social psychology, from a fundamental and adaptionist paradigm, its puzzling 
features can be reconsidered and better explained in terms of their functions and the adaptive, 
ultimate goals they intend to serve. 
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To begin addressing these issues, this dissertation draws from two important lines of 
evolutionary-based research on life history theory (e.g., Griskevicius, Delton, Robertson, & 
Tybur, 2011) and sociometer theory (e.g., Leary et al., 1995) to propose a parsimonious 
account of how self-esteem might fluctuate and influence our behavior according to our 
fundamental survival and reproductive strategies. In particular, how does self-esteem 
facilitate the attainment of fundamentally important goals, and how do people decide what 
goals are worth pursuing and fretting over? The evolutionary perspective argues that goals 
are best conceived in terms of their adaptive function, and the goals that people want to 
achieve in life are ultimately tied to their desire to survive well, acquire mates, and reproduce 
eventually (e.g., Kenrick, Neuberg, & Cialdini, 2007; Kenrick, Li, & Butner, 2003). 
According to this perspective, self-esteem is a function of one’s attainment of adaptive goals. 
The integration of life history theory into the study of human behavior and psychology is 
increasingly pervasive as life history theory offers a powerful framework for understanding 
how organisms, including humans, strategically allocate their finite time, energy, and 
resources across all sorts of major life activities given their ecological constraints and 
opportunities (Ellis, Figueredo, Brumbach, & Schlomer, 2009). These various life activities 
are adaptive tasks and goals which ultimately facilitate specific strategic routes to survival 
and reproductive success, and people calibrate their preferred strategy according to their 
developmental circumstances—i.e., their life history (Charnov, 1993; Stearns, 1992)—which 
in turn determines the domains and associated goals that they adaptively prioritize and take 
seriously. In other words, the domains that underlie self-esteem map onto the domains that 
are prioritized by life history such that, when a domain is weighted heavily according to a 
person’s developmental circumstances, his or her self-esteem is expected to be positively 
correlated with value in that domain. How well one fares in a prioritized domain is therefore 
expected to have stronger implications for his or her self-esteem than how well he or she 
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fares in an unprioritized domain. For example, compared to people who grew up in safe and 
stable environments, people who grew up in poor or harsh environments are more likely to 
discount the future, have a larger appetite for risk, prefer a faster pace to having children, and 
place greater urgency on mating and reproductive goals (Griskevicius et al., 2011; Ellis et al., 
2009). Thus, for people who grew up in poor or harsh environments, success in the domains 
associated with short-term gains and sooner (high quantity) reproduction may influence their 
self-esteem more strongly than success in the domains associated with long-term gains and 
later (high quality) reproduction. Through this framework, which accounts for variations in 
the allocation of effort across various major life activities, life history theory offers a way to 
determine people’s prioritization of life domains (and associated goals) according to their 
developmental circumstances, which then addresses the domains (and goal attainment status 
in those domains) that most significantly influence self-esteem. 
From an evolutionary perspective, our feelings are functional mechanisms that serve 
important, adaptive purposes (Nesse, 1990). One might feel more or less positive with the 
self depending on one’s accomplishments, ability, or value in personally relevant and 
important areas of life. Rather than being an end in itself, this overall self-evaluative feeling 
likely functions as a gauge instead—i.e., a sociometer—that monitors one’s status in 
important life domains and draws attention to the domains that require corrective action 
(Leary, 2005). Simply being able to gauge the current state of affairs is, however, not 
adaptively helpful unless that gauge is used to strategically calibrate appropriate behavior. 
Thus our adaptive self-esteem, like gas meters and thermostats that influence the behavior of 
machinery, also serve to influence people such that they behave in ways that promote higher 
value (achieve successes) or prevent low value (avoid failures) in important life domains. 
This perspective, which argues for the regulation and facilitation of goal attainments, can 
further specify how people’s numerous self-biased behaviors occur and why. On the surface, 
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and when viewed from the perspective that people have a need for self-esteem, self-biased 
behaviors appear to be enacted just for the sake of feeling better about oneself, and some of 
the behaviors that people selectively engage in to maintain a positive self-image seem 
delusional. However, the current perspective sheds light on their functioning as mechanisms 
of self-esteem which serve to promote adaptive behavior. Specifically, value in a life history-
prioritized domain directs the persistence of effort such that low value produces self-
protection efforts while high value produces self-enhancement efforts (Alicke & Sedikides, 
2009). This mechanism of self-esteem compels people to actively manage their value in their 
prioritized domains by seeking success while avoiding failures in pursuing their goals. 
Conversely, low value in an unprioritized domain leads to a devaluation of that domain 
(Major & Schmader, 1998) and abandonment of effort so that effort can be channelled more 
fruitfully elsewhere. 
Taken together, by providing a fundamental explanatory account grounded on the 
adaptive nature of our psychology, this proposed integrated life history and sociometer model 
of self-esteem has the potential to address questions left unanswered by previous self-esteem 
research and unify the various disparate approaches. Previous conclusions drawn from self-
esteem research that are guided by relatively isolated “mini-theories” (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 
1979; Martiny & Rubin, 2016; Elms, 1975) can be misleading, as in the notion that people 
have a self-esteem need as if self-esteem is a commodity with value in and of itself (Ryan & 
Brown, 2003; Kurzban & Atkipis, 2007; Swann Jr., Chang-Schneider, & McClarty, 2007), or 
that different people equally value the same goals (cf., Kenrick et al., 2002). Understanding 
the fundamental factors that influence people’s self-esteem from which systematic 
predictions can be made about self-esteem as well as its associated behaviors is crucial to 
advancing our knowledge on self-esteem, from which a more accurate understanding of the 
dynamics between self-esteem and various life outcomes can be achieved. Although the 
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contribution this work is making is mainly theoretical, two empirical studies are offered as an 
introductory rather than extensive or exhaustive attempt to test the proposed model to predict 
how people prioritize adaptive goals in various domains, how one’s value (i.e., worth, status, 
or ability) in those domains affect global self-esteem, and how various self-biased behaviors 
may be differentially predicted.  
 
2. Self-esteem 
The study of self-esteem has dominated social psychology since its early beginnings. 
William James (1890) emphasized the individual factors underlying self-esteem by regarding 
it as the ratio of one’s successes to goals that are important in life. Symbolic interactionism 
approaches that arose later stressed the social factors that influence self-esteem, whereby 
views of the self are formed from feedback (implicit or explicit) given by others (Cooley, 
1902; Goffman, 1959; Mead, 1934). More recent definitions assert that self-esteem should be 
distinguished from other self-concept components (e.g., self-efficacy, self-awareness) insofar 
as self-esteem specifically represents the affective evaluative component of the self-concept 
(Leary & Baumeister, 2000). 
Contemporary treatments of self-esteem typically regard it as a global construct 
reflecting an “individual’s positive or negative attitude toward the self as a totality” 
(Rosenberg et al., 1995; p. 141). How one feels about or judges the self is therefore central to 
the definition of self-esteem, which also makes it distinct from other subjective well-being 
factors, such as life satisfaction. According to Diener and Diener (1995), both self-esteem and 
life satisfaction indicate one’s global evaluations, yet the direction and basis of these 
evaluations differ. Whereas life satisfaction involves an individual’s cognitive evaluation of 
how fulfilled, gratified, or pleased he or she is with life as a whole including its various 
subdomains such as school, family, and friends, self-esteem reflects an individual’s overall 
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attitude toward the worthiness, respectability, or value of the self (James, 1890; Leary & 
MacDonald, 2003). As drivers of behavior, achieving satisfaction is associated more closely 
with goal satiation and cessation of action, whereas achieving esteem is associated more 
closely with sustained goal pursuit and continued motivation to maintain or elevate the worth 
and value of the self. Thus, people who are dissatisfied with various areas in life still can still 
feel good about themselves and have high self-esteem, as the two constructs conceptually 
differ.  
The positive correlations that have been found between self-esteem and various 
important psychological and behavioral outcomes appear to suggest that self-esteem is 
directly responsible for our psychological well-being (e.g., Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; 
Epstein, 2003; Pyszczynski et al., 2004; Wills, 1981; Juth et al., 2008; Cheng & Furnham, 
2003; Rosenberg, 1965). For instance, some studies have found low self-esteem to be 
associated with anxiety and depressive symptoms (Cutrona, 1982; White, 1981) and high 
self-esteem to be associated with positive affective states (Taylor & Brown, 1988). Self-
esteem has also been argued to produce better social adjustment, health, and performance 
across various tasks (Branden, 1994; Smelser, 1989; Baumeister, 1993; Greenberg et al., 
1992). Some researchers have also suggested that socially undesirable behaviors such as 
aggression are caused by having low self-esteem (cf., Baumeister & Boden, 1998). 
The need to maintain self-esteem has been implicated for people’s numerous self-
serving behaviors and cognitions. For instance, people are adept at processing information in 
a biased manner such that conclusions that flatter the self are reached (Kruglanski, 1989). 
These “positive illusions” have been conceptualized as manifestations of the motivation to 
either self-enhance or self-protect in order to maintain the positivity of their self-concept 
(Taylor & Brown, 1988). People solicit positive feedback about their social behavior 
(Sedikides, 1993) and selectively interact with others who are likely to provide it (Sanitioso 
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& Wlodarski, 2004). People also self-handicap through self-defeating behavior (e.g., drug 
consumption, procrastination; Ferrari & Tice, 2000; Jones & Berglas, 1978) so that, if one 
fails, self-esteem can be protected by blaming the external cause, but if one succeeds, self-
esteem can be enhanced because success was achieved despite the obstacle (Rhodewalt, 
Morf, Hazlett, & Fairfield, 1991). People also selectively disregard threatening evaluative 
information about their self-worth in particular domains of life either by devaluing the 
importance of success in those domains or downplaying the diagnosticity of the negative 
feedback received, which allows them to legitimize the lack of effort in life domains where 
they are unlikely to succeed (Schmader, Major, Eccleston, & McCoy, 2001).  
The initial conclusions reached based on these findings is that self-esteem is a human 
need, building self-esteem can lead to more desirable outcomes and promote a better life, and 
people are therefore motivated to protect or build self-esteem (cf., Leary, 2005) as if it were 
an end in itself, the deficiency of which is akin to hunger when lacking in nutrition. This 
strong psychological claim permeated popular beliefs throughout the 1980s and 1990s due to 
efforts by self-esteem advocates such as Nathaniel Branden, who stated that “self-esteem has 
profound consequences for every aspect of our existence” (Branden, 1994; p. 5), and that he 
“cannot think of a single psychological problem—from anxiety and depression, to fear of 
intimacy or of success, to spouse battery or child molestation—that is not traceable to the 
problem of low self-esteem” (Branden, 1984, p. 12). Other purveyors of self-esteem, such as 
Andrew Mecca, have also been cited as saying that “virtually every social problem can be 
traced to people’s lack of self-love” (Davis, 1988; p. 10). 
However, despite the numerous correlates of self-esteem identified by extant research, 
stringent studies more recently have found that “people with high self-esteem seem sincerely 
to believe they are smarter, more accomplished, more popular and likable, more attractive, 
and so forth, but some of those apparent advantages are illusory” (Baumeister et al., 2003; p. 
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42). When confounding factors such as intelligence and socioeconomic status were controlled 
for, the effects of self-esteem on health, relationships, and other life outcomes were 
significantly reduced (e.g., Boden et al., 2008; Emler, 2001). Additionally, the relationship 
between self-esteem and aggression is anything but clear-cut. Baumeister and Boden’s (1998) 
comprehensive review concluded that little evidence actually supports the claim that 
aggression is caused by having low self-esteem; instead, a whole range of evidence suggests 
that unduly high positive self-views rather than negative self-views lead to feelings of 
entitlement and narcissism, which triggers aggressive behavior. Lastly, if we are to take the 
argument that people have a need for self-esteem at face value, then the numerous self-biased 
behaviors that people regularly indulge in have to be viewed as ultimately pointless and 
irrational because people are striving to preserve a view of the self that is delusionally more 
positive than warranted. That is, people are fooling themselves about how good (or not bad) 
they are to maintain positive self-feelings. That such a wide range of commonplace behaviors 
can be viewed in a negative light as irrational biases or flaws suggests that the paradigm 
through which we regard these behaviors is, in itself, suspect; if these behaviors are 
ubiquitous, then perhaps there are critical reasons for their existence and they need to be 
understood differently and more carefully (cf., Haselton, Nettle, & Andrews, 2005; Funder, 
1987; Kenrick et al., 2009). These problematic findings and conclusions have prompted 
various researchers to develop better ways to address these weak or mixed effects of self-
esteem. 
 
2.1. Alternative approaches to self-esteem 
One approach that scholars have taken to address the shortcomings of self-esteem 
research is to demonstrate that, rather than being an end in itself, self-esteem is instead 
dependent on real events and accomplishments (Kirkpatrick & Ellis, 2001; Kurzban & 
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Atkipis, 2007). From this functional viewpoint, self-esteem’s purpose extends far beyond 
some superficial “feel good factor” to more fundamentally enabling people to recognize 
whether they have successfully enacted their desired strategies in life and achieved important 
life goals. Thus, the positive feelings associated with high self-esteem occur as a result of 
successes and serve as a reward to encourage more achievement, whereas the negative 
feelings associated with failures serve as a reminder to make up for those failures and not to 
commit the mistakes that led to those failures again (Leary et al., 1995; Kurzban, 2010). This 
functional approach to self-esteem has garnered convincing evidence showing that career 
success and other desired outcomes, for instance, tend to correlate with higher scores on 
measures of self-esteem, but inflating someone’s sense of self does not lead to more career 
success or better outcomes (e.g., Perez, 1973; Judge & Bono, 2001). Without carefully 
establishing that the causal direction of accomplishments leading to self-esteem is stronger 
than that of self-esteem leading to accomplishments, the correlation between self-esteem and 
accomplishments had, therefore, initially led to the erroneous conclusion that “high self-
esteem is not only desirable in its own right, but also the central psychological source from 
which all manner of positive behaviors and outcomes spring” (Baumeister et al., 2003; p. 3). 
In other words, positive psychology advocates calling for the promotion of self-esteem had 
incorrectly concluded that the relationship between increased self-esteem and positive life 
outcomes is equally bidirectional. On the contrary, rather than promoting desirable outcomes, 
artificially boosting a person’s self-esteem (e.g., giving a child a prize just for participating to 
protect his feelings) can lead to baseless positive self-views instead, which do not constitute 
authentic self-esteem and are instead more closely related to fragile self-esteem or narcissism 
(Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Campbell, Rudich, & Sedikides, 2002). The functional 
approach to self-esteem thus established that, rather than there being any such thing as a 
“self-esteem motive” or “need for self-esteem”, a more accurate conception of self-esteem 
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construes it as an emergent, affective state that serves the purpose of providing feedback 
about the status of actual accomplishments (Leary, 2005).  
Another approach that scholars have taken is based on the predictor-outcome 
matching principle (Swann Jr. et al., 2007) that the specificity of measures and outcomes 
should be conceptually similar, otherwise the strength of the relationship between the 
predictor and outcome variables will certainly be weak (Crocker et al., 2003; Fleming & 
Courtney, 1984; Rosenberg et al., 1995). This approach emphasized the importance of 
recognizing the domains that underlie the self and the specificity of their relationship with 
various outcomes. For instance, in Shavelson and colleagues’ (1976) hierarchical model of 
the self (Figure 1), the self can be differentiated between general, academic, social, 
emotional, and physical self-concept domains, and each domain can still be divided further. 
The academic domain, for example, can be further differentiated as subject-specific domains 
such as English, history, science, and mathematics. When these self-concept domains were 
specifically examined, the mathematical self-concept of high school students was strongly 
related to their mathematics achievement, and the strength of the relationship decreased as 
mathematics achievement was compared with the more global academic self-concept, and it 
decreased even further when compared with the content-distinct verbal self-concept (Marsh 
& O’Neill, 1984). 
This is related to a third argument that scholars have made (for the rather obvious 
point) that self-esteem should be more sensitive to events and circumstances that are relevant 
to the domains that people value strongly (Harter & Marold, 1991; MacDonald et al., 2003; 
Sheldon & Houser-Marko, 2001). According to this contingency approach, for example, the 
self-esteem of people who place greater importance on work performance is more likely 
affected by their work performance compared to people who do not care so much about work 
performance (Ferris, Lian, Brown, Pang, & Keeping, 2010). Intuitively, things that do not 
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matter to us are unlikely to bother us, and indeed people sometimes downplay the importance 
of a low-performing domain so as to discredit what it says about their overall worth and thus 
be less bothered by poor performance in that domain (e.g., Schmader et al., 2001). The 
relationship between self-esteem and particular psychological or behavioral events would, 
therefore, be robust only when those events are linked to domains that significantly underlie 
one’s self-concept. 
These arguments have certainly advanced our understanding of self-esteem, but each 
only to a limited degree. Due to researchers focusing on any one of these approaches 
separately from other approaches when addressing prior limitations of self-esteem, 
substantial questions remain unanswered where a parsimonious model can potentially 
integrate and simultaneously resolve these research gaps. For example, researchers examining 
the function of self-esteem have insightfully established that self-esteem facilitates the 
monitoring of progress towards achieving important life goals but do not address the range of 
goals that underlie people’s self-esteem, which leads to the overgeneralization that people 
value the same goals in life (cf., Kenrick et al., 2002). The issue of what goals shape people’s 
self-esteem is within the purview of researchers who have focused on the underlying domains 
of self-esteem, but domain-focused researchers fall short of systematically addressing how 
self-esteem might regulate the pursuit of goals in these domains. These approaches also do 
not examine the important processes through which self-esteem might actually carry out its 
functional work to promote effective goal pursuit. Rather than viewing the numerous self-
biased behaviors that people engage in as delusions to fool themselves in a bid to make 
themselves feel better, these self-biased behaviors may instead reflect the important 
functional mechanisms of self-esteem. Self-enhancement, self-protection, or the devaluation 
of domains may represent processes through which self-esteem facilitates people’s attainment 
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of important life goals, but the self-esteem literature has thus far failed to produce an 
integration of these self-biased behaviors within a broader theoretical framework. 
In addition, although social psychologists have examined the domains underlying the 
self for some time now, “they had no a priori theoretical reasons for the choice of their 
domains” (Kruger et al., 2007; p. 555). Without the use of powerful theoretical frameworks 
that focus on people’s drives and motives at a fundamental level, the domain frameworks that 
researchers have developed have been rather unsatisfactory and sometimes carry at least a 
hint of bias (if not blatantly) depending on the researcher’s personal idiosyncrasies. For 
instance, Crocker et al. (2003) developed a set of life domains that supposedly determines 
people’s self-worth which included academics, appearance, approval from others, 
competition, family support, God’s love, and virtue, which is fairly Christian-centric. Another 
undesired consequence of developing domains without using theories grounded in 
fundamental aspects of human nature is the slew of domain frameworks available in the 
literature, and we are often left to rhetorical persuasiveness rather than objective standards to 
decide which domain frameworks are more valid than others (cf., Elms, 1975; Kurzban, 
2010). Researchers who call for an emphasis on the contingency effects of self-esteem argue 
that self-worth depends on success in life domains that are important to the self, but without a 
theoretical model that addresses how people prioritize particular goals over a wide range of 
many possible goals that can be pursued, current self-esteem research is also silent on how 
the importance of these domains is calibrated and prioritized for each individual in a 
systematic way.  
In summary, both earlier and later approaches to understanding self-esteem fall short 
of providing an accurate or holistic account of self-esteem. The early theory of the need for 
self-esteem as a cause of psychological well-being, self-biased behaviors, and social behavior 
is initially appealing because it seems coherent and thus “provides an answer that is more 
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understandable than esoteric claims about genetics, heritability, and diatheses”, thereby 
creating an easy “villain” (Ferguson, Winegard, & Winegard, 2011, p. 15). However, 
conveniently blaming our lack of self-esteem for everything without a thorough consideration 
of its underlying psychological mechanisms may be misleading, as it is not clear why, for 
instance, people need to feel good about themselves to function well in life, why some people 
who feel good about themselves still exhibit so-called socially undesirable behaviors, or why 
people prefer to delude themselves through self-promoting and self-enhancing behaviors (cf., 
Baumeister et al., 2005) . Later approaches contribute some insights to where earlier self-
esteem theories may be improved, but these relatively isolated “mini-theories” often elucidate 
proximate processes, or causes that are closest to or immediately responsible for the positivity 
of self-views. That is not to say that any of these approaches are invalid, but rather their 
explanatory power is individually limited. With an understanding of a higher-level ultimate 
or underlying root cause responsible for the disparate immediate factors observed across 
different lines of research, the insights gleaned from these various approaches can be 
integrated to form a more powerful, overarching framework to understand self-esteem. 
This dissertation aims to make a theoretical contribution by using two evolutionary-
based theories, life history theory and sociometer theory, to suggest how important, 
unanswered issues concerning self-esteem research might be parsimoniously addressed, 
including what domains should affect self-esteem, how domains might be prioritized, and 
how value and self-worth in each domain is managed. Evolutionary theory, which is 
grounded in biology and the evolutionary processes from which all living organisms 
(including human beings) are universally bound by, is precisely one such theoretical 
framework that is well-suited for the task. By addressing both the functional and fundamental 
aspects of psychology, the evolutionary perspective may strongly benefit our understanding 
of self-esteem where current perspectives have failed to do so thus far. 
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3. An evolutionary approach to self-esteem 
The evolutionary biologist and Eastern Orthodox Christian Theodosius Dobzhansky 
(1973) once wrote that “nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution”. For 
example, it is difficult to understand the workings of a stomach (e.g., the working relationship 
between digestive tracts, stomach acid, and gastric pains) if one is not aware of the adaptive 
functions of nutrition and hunger. Endeavoring to understand our traits through a non-
evolutionary lens often only produces best-guesses of proximate theoretical models. For 
instance, without an understanding of the evolutionary precursors of sex differences, 
differences between men and women have often been attributed to the proximately obvious 
but explanatorily dissatisfactory influence of culture and socialization (cf., Oliver & Hyde, 
1993). Questions still remain about why sex differences are generally similar across cultures 
(Buss, 1989), a phenomenon suggesting that, more than just arising from a random process or 
socialization, the sexes act the way they do due to another, more fundamental factor at play—
their individual, respective reproductive interests as shaped by evolution, such that, across 
cultures, men and women tend to behave, on average, in accordance with one’s biological sex 
(Buss, 1989; Buss & Schmitt, 1993; Symons, 1979; Trivers, 1972; Miller, 2000). The 
evolutionary perspective has therefore been employed to great effect in resolving the gaps of 
many prevailing psychological topics, which exist due to limitations in the explanatory power 
of their theoretical models (cf., Buss & Kenrick, 1998). 
Because evolutionary psychology addresses human psychology at a fundamental, 
adaptive level according to biological and evolutionary standards that all living organisms 
must abide by, a firm basis therefore exists from which examinations of various 
psychological and behavioral phenomena can spring forth. More specifically, the wide range 
of psychological traits we possess can be systematically examined according to their evolved 
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function, or what they were designed to help us do. Evolutionary psychology views our 
psychology and behavior as products of adaptive psychological mechanisms that operate 
automatically at a subconscious level. These psychological adaptations gave our ancestors an 
edge in survival and reproduction, allowing them to outreproduce those who did not have 
these adaptations, and thus the genes that code for these adaptations are passed on to later 
generations and exist in all modern humans (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). 
These evolutionary problems of survival and reproduction (i.e., specific selection 
pressures) define the domains that we should be most concerned about at a fundamental level. 
Like physiological adaptations, the human mind is not a general-purpose computer but 
instead consists of a rich array of adaptations for solving evolutionarily recurrent problems in 
specific domains. The evolutionary perspective therefore regards domain-specificity as a 
central tenet: just like how an eye was designed specifically to see and not to grasp objects, 
our psychological adaptations are evolved to be highly specific and to deal with problems in 
specific domains, and are thus not well suited for solving problems in other domains 
(Cosmides and Tooby, 1994; Hagen, 2001). Domains are defined according to adaptive 
problems, such as hunger (eating food), social inclusion (having friends), social status 
(having adequate resource-acquisition potential), mating (finding a copulation partner), and 
parenting (raising offspring) (Kenrick et al., 2002). The more important the adaptive problem, 
the more intensely natural selection will improve and specialize the mechanism for solving it, 
because failure to overcome the adaptive problem will consequently lead to survival and 
reproductive failure. The human mind thus includes many functionally distinct adaptive 
specializations that are domain-specific (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992), including self-esteem 
and self-biased behaviors, which function to promote survival and reproductive success while 
avoiding failures (i.e., improve fitness). Adaptive goals are essentially the fundamental needs 
that humans generally desire to meet (although individual differences do influence the 
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domains that are considered important, which will be discussed further later). While the 
psychological literature has generated a wide range of valid domains in life that people can be 
more or less concerned with, evolutionary domain-specificity is based on a functional 
analysis of the many qualitatively distinct kinds of adaptive problems of survival and 
reproduction faced by our ancestral predecessors, thereby making it possible to 
parsimoniously classify a wide range of behaviors within a well-grounded theoretical 
foundation (Kirkpatrick et al., 2002). These two distinct approaches to domain-specificity can 
lead to rather different ways of organizing the domains underlying the self. For instance, at a 
descriptive level, academic domains might be distinguished from athletic domains in a school 
population, but at a functional, evolutionary level of analysis, these two domains overlap as 
both can represent contexts for gaining status. The evolutionary perspective is therefore a 
natural contender for simultaneously addressing the function of self-esteem, the domains that 
underlie self-esteem, and how the prioritization of domains is calibrated so that survival and 
reproductive success can be optimized. 
While this dissertation strives to address the shortcomings of a grand social 
psychological theory (self-esteem) using an evolutionary perspective, this effort is certainly 
not the first of its kind. Recognizing the utility of the adaptationist and functionalist 
approaches espoused by evolutionary psychology, social psychologists have increasingly 
examined various social psychological phenomena through an evolutionary lens (e.g., Leary 
et al., 1995; Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Buss & Kenrick, 1998; Kruger et al., 2007; 
Kirkpatrick & Ellis, 2001; Ellis et al., 2009). For example, and pertinent to the current 
dissertation, the social psychologist Mark Leary developed a functional, adaptive model of 
self-esteem which he termed “sociometer theory”. By exploiting the insight that humans have 
an evolved fundamental need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), Leary (2005) argued 
that rather than there being some fundamental need for self-esteem, self-esteem instead 
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serves as a sociometer or a psychological gauge which evolved for the purpose of monitoring 
and increasing one’s social, relational, or interpersonal value. Another theory founded on 
evolutionary principles, life history theory, which can account for individual differences in 
impulsivity, risk appetite, and preferences for shorter versus longer term rewards (e.g., Ellis 
et al., 2009; Griskevicius et al., 2011), has also been extensively integrated in the 
examination of variable personality phenomena such as aggression, conscientiousness, 
sociosexuality, and risk-taking (e.g., Sherman, Figueredo, & Funder, 2013; Wang, Kruger, & 
Wilke, 2009),  as well as why people prioritize the goals or tasks of  particular domains over 
others (e.g., White, Li, Griskevicius, Neuberg, & Kenrick, 2013). 
The current dissertation will draw from these evolutionarily based theories to develop 
a novel model of self-esteem which extends beyond Leary’s socially driven account of the 
sociometer, by first proposing that the sociometer’s work concerns not just social acceptance 
but various other domains that may be of adaptive value to people depending on the goals 
they prefer to pursue. Further, the variety of people’s self-biased behaviors, which may 
generally appear to be enacted to maintain self-esteem at a proximate level, are also discussed 
in terms of their adaptive role as features of the sociometer that enable people to exert effort 
appropriately to achieve the goals they desire. Life history theory will next be discussed to 
address how people’s childhood developmental circumstances influence the importance of 
particular adaptive domains such that their goal preferences are calibrated and prioritized. 
The various domains that social psychologists purport to underlie the self (and thus, have 
more or less implications for self-esteem) can be determined and mapped according to life 
history theory, and can potentially also simultaneously account for the gaps identified in the 
preceding section.  
 
3.1. Sociometer theory 
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In the reconceptualization of self-esteem from ends to means, Leary et al. (1995) 
proposed his theory of self-esteem as a sociometer—a psychological gauge that monitors the 
status of individuals in tackling adaptive life tasks, such as obtaining social inclusion and 
interpersonal acceptance. This functional model of self-esteem asserts that self-esteem is not 
a goal in itself to seek, but is instead a psychological readout on one’s success at achieving 
life’s adaptive goals. Leary’s sociometer work represents one of the most successful 
functional approaches to self-esteem, amassing a great deal of empirical evidence for his 
theory (e.g., Leary et al., 1995; Bourgeois & Leary, 2001; Leary et al., 2003; Leary, Haupt, 
Strausser, & Chokel, 1998; Leary, Cottrell, & Philips, 2001). 
From an adaptive standpoint, the function of affective systems is to dispense feelings 
(i.e., moods and emotions) which push us to engage in fitness-enhancing behaviors, or 
behaviors that promote better survival and reproduction (Nesse, 1990). Positive emotions 
motivate the organism to take advantage of environmental opportunities and to recognize 
when it has succeeded in doing so (Nesse & Ellsworth, 2009). For instance, John’s success in 
defending his doctoral dissertation is accompanied by a strong sense of pride (and perhaps 
also relief). Such positive feelings signal to him that he has attained an accomplishment in the 
domain of social status—John is now officially endowed the title of Doctor; John has done 
something right, adaptively. Accordingly, John and many other people engage in activities 
ranging from mastering skills (e.g., playing the guitar, studying advanced mathematics, 
writing books, etc) to finding mates because success or engagement in these activities 
promise positive feelings at the proximate level, and they are also adaptive goal pursuits at 
the ultimate, evolutionary level. That is, success at adaptive goal pursuits leads to fitness 
gains, thereby increasing the likelihood that the organism will survive and reproduce better. 
Conversely, negative feelings signal either potential, impending failure or failure that has 
already occurred, which motivate the organism to avoid future harm or repair pre-existing 
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damage (Nesse & Ellsworth, 2009). For example, the awareness of physical pain associated 
with car accidents makes John more careful when driving in future, while experiencing 
shame when John picked up a drink-driving ticket makes him feel the need to make it up to 
his disappointed parents and repair relations with them. 
Self-esteem works similarly. From a functional, adaptive standpoint, negative and 
positive feelings toward the self are evolved mechanisms specially designed to provide 
individuals with feedback about one’s status in terms of achieving important, adaptive tasks 
(Kenrick, Li, & Butner, 2003; Kenrick, Griskevicius, Neuberg, & Schaller, 2010). One’s 
status in terms of achieving the tasks within a domain is synonymous with his or her value 
within that domain. John’s positive self-evaluations (or when John experiences a boost to 
self-esteem) are instances of feedback telling him that he has fared well and thus has value, 
such as when he receives compliments from a girl he fancies, successfully executes a high-
profile task at work, or is invited to an exclusive party. John’s negative feelings about himself 
(or when John’s self-esteem takes a hit) tell him that something bad had just happened, such 
as when his friends deliberately leave him out of a social gathering, when the girl he fancies 
rejects his advances, or when he fails at carrying out an important task entrusted to him. 
The sociometer account of self-esteem differs from the seemingly similar self-
regulation and goal pursuit theory in some important ways. Although regulatory models in 
service of achieving goals (i.e., feedback loop systems; cf., Carver & Scheier, 2002) underlie 
both theories, self-regulation requires metacognition as part of its theoretical model, or a 
conscious executive function that manages the self, including the process of guiding one’s 
own thoughts, behaviors, and feelings to reach goals (Baumeister & Vohs, 2003), whereas 
sociometer theory asserts that any regulation of the self towards adaptive goals has already 
been figured out through evolution and does not necessitate any conscious awareness. In 
other words, the sociometer view states that our evolved psychology is inclined towards 
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making us experience particular feelings that should naturally compel us towards appropriate 
actions that, regardless of any awareness of this process, are directed toward the 
accomplishment of important goals. This conceptual difference might be subtle, but it has 
important theoretical and practical implications. Baumeister and Vohs’s (2003) self-
regulatory theory will judge, for instance, low self-control (or high impulsivity) to be an 
undesirable character trait as it hinders long-term goal pursuit. On the other hand, an 
evolutionary perspective will consider the conditions under which impulsivity might have 
evolved and benefit the attainment of adaptive goals. People who are impulsive tend to 
discount the future and have a higher appetite for risk (Baumann & Odum, 2012), but such 
traits may actually be advantageous in situations where opportunities and resource niches are 
rare, and people with higher impulsivity might actually thrive better in those environments 
(Kruger, Wang, & Wilke, 2007; Stevens & Stephens, 2010). Impulsivity, viewed as poor self-
control by self-regulation theorists, would thus instead be subsumed under sociometer theory 
as an adaptive trait, insofar as the sociometer dispenses impulses to seize opportunities it 
deems as adaptively important. Further, because metacognition isn’t necessary in the 
sociometer model of goal pursuit, by Occam’s razor, sociometer theory is the more 
parsimonious theory (Blumer, Ehrenfeucht, Haussler, & Warmuth, 1987). Sociometer theory 
makes no assumptions that non-humans cannot have a sense of self-esteem either; if a male 
chimpanzee with debatable levels of consciousness languishes in the attainment of its 
adaptive goals (e.g., be part of a coalition, find mates, defeat the alpha male), he is likely to 
feel low about the self, experience emotions just perhaps as humans would that will 
encourage it to do something about the situation it is in, and avoid being caught in dire straits 
eventually. An alpha chimpanzee could very well have high self-esteem.  
Importantly, self-evaluations should be determined and accompanied by actual events 
and circumstances. Any attempt at raising self-esteem without real accomplishments (e.g., 
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delusional self-talk or undue compliments) is as good as pushing the gas meter of a car from 
empty to full without actually refuelling the car. Indeed, the misguided positive psychology 
movement, especially during the 1970s to 1990s, to shelter and sugarcoat everything so as not 
to bruise the allegedly fragile egos of those around us can lead to unwarrantedly high self-
esteem and narcissism (Baumeister & Boden, 1998; Swann Jr. et al., 2007), and artificially 
boosting self-esteem has also been found to impair performance in a variety of tasks 
(Baumeister et al., 2005).  
The crux of the original sociometer work on self-esteem is that human beings are a 
social species and that inclusion in social groups is adaptive. This is generally true as humans 
typically cannot survive alone; thus the need to belong as a fundamental motive (Baumeister 
& Leary, 1995) has, over evolutionary time, contributed to the fitness of our species (Buss & 
Kenrick, 1998). The genes that code for such psychological inclinations to be part of social 
groups while avoiding ostracism are passed through the generations (Kurzban & Leary, 
2001), and modern humans across the world therefore generally seek social acceptance, enjoy 
being socially included, and care about how others evaluate their social worth (Leary, 2005). 
However, the overly narrow focus on social acceptance and inclusion is an artifact of 
Leary’s social psychological background on the sociometer’s theoretical foundations. This is 
problematic if the sociometer is to be conceptualized as an adaptive psychological 
mechanism. More fundamentally, it is specifically the adaptive benefits provided by living in 
a group that has driven these effects, not that one belongs in social groups per se. Stated 
differently, most work on the sociometer has either focused on social inclusion as a proximal 
mechanism, oversimplified the sociometer as social or relational value, or assumed that all 
goal pursuits in life are ultimately geared towards improving one’s social worth (Knowles, 
Lucas, Molden, Gardner, & Dean, 2010). As asserted by Leary (2005) himself, it might be 
pointless or unnecessary to expand the sociometer to include conscientiousness in non-social 
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domains because “success, achievement, and mastery in any domain are more socially valued 
than failure, non-achievement, and ineptness” (italics mine; p. 98-99). This assertion, 
however, misses the point that we desire to be socially accepted precisely because being in 
groups is the solution to the adaptive problems associated with our status as relatively 
physically weak mammals living in exposed areas (Bowles & Gintis, 2011), just as meerkats 
or verve monkeys are. Social species all suffer from exclusion, and thus our evolved 
psychology is designed to remind us to be in groups because of the adaptive costs of being 
alone (MacDonald, 2007). In the event that belonging to groups carries more costs than 
pursuing some alternative goal (or the corollary that pursuing some alternative goal produces 
more benefits than belonging to groups), a broader view of the sociometer would suggest that 
one’s social value would have less of an influence on their self-esteem than their status 
towards achieving that other goal, or their worth or value in that other domain. A more 
fundamental and accurate conception of the sociometer feedback system should consider self-
esteem as an adaptive system that evolved to encourage individuals to seek out not just social 
connections, but also any other adaptive desiderata because of the improvements to fitness 
that they provide. 
Further, while the sociometer perspective establishes the evaluative feedback function 
of self-esteem, less has been explored about what domains people should generally be 
concerned about, and what makes people prioritize particular domains over a multitude of 
others. Life history theory has the potential to plug these research gaps by providing a well-
grounded evolutionary framework which can predict organisms’ strategic allocation of 
resources towards the important domains in life, thereby specifying what the sociometer 
should be sensitive towards for particular individuals. 
 
3.2. Life history strategies 
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At the heart of life history theory is the question of how organisms, including humans, 
allocate their finite time, energy, and resources across various fitness-enhancing pursuits. The 
integration of life history theory into the study of human behavior and psychology is 
becoming increasingly important and pervasive (e.g., Chisholm 1993; Figueredo et al. 2006; 
Ellis et al., 2009) as life history theory provides a powerful framework for understanding 
variations in people’s preferences, risk appetites, and a host of other individual differences as 
a function of their developmental circumstances. From this perspective, all the major life 
activities that people generally want to partake in—finding a romantic partner, doing well in 
school, earning money—are proximate manifestations of the pursuit of fundamentally 
important adaptive goals; that is, survival and reproduction. Variations in people’s 
preferences for particular goals over others therefore signal differences in the strategies 
sought to enhance fitness. One person might, for instance, prefer to go to college, get a 
degree, and secure a well-paying job, whereas another person might prefer to forgo school 
and peddle drugs. Both strategies imply different appetites for risk and differences in 
temporal preferences for returns, but the intentions of their efforts are similar—to acquire 
resources. According to life history theory, a person’s preferred strategy is dependent on his 
or her perceptions of harshness, stability, security, risks, and opportunities in the ecology 
from which he or she grew (Ellis et al., 2009), which calibrates their sense of how 
opportunities should be seized, how effort should be allocated across various endeavors in 
life, and the domains that are most relevant to their own survival and reproductive success. 
Hence, life history offers a systematic and meaningful way to understand the goals that 
people generally want to pursue and how their preferences and self-views are shaped 
according to the life domains that those goals belong to. 
Although survival and reproduction are often considered the two most fundamental 
motives of all living organisms that face senescence, survival without reproduction in 
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evolutionary terms is ultimately pointless (Miller, 2000). Sexually reproducing organisms 
that survive well but do not mate will not pass on their genes, thus constituting an 
evolutionary dead-end. Stated differently, the main purpose of survival is to support an 
organism through to sexual maturity and successful reproduction, after which any additional 
survival, if not for taking care of offspring or finding surplus mates, is considerable luxury. 
All sexually reproducing species are therefore faced with two fundamental adaptive 
problems: investing more in various aspects of survival first—such as increasing ability, 
knowledge, and status—while delaying reproduction (i.e., somatic effort), or reproducing as 
soon as possible (i.e., mating effort). As described by Griskevicius and colleagues (2011), 
“Whereas investing in somatic effort is analogous to building a bank account, investing in 
reproductive effort is analogous to spending this account in ways that help replicate the bank 
account owner’s genes. […] Just as people do not put money in a bank account for the sake 
of having a bank account, somatic effort—growth, maintenance, and learning—is not an end 
in itself. Instead, investment in somatic effort is investment in future reproduction: By 
growing a larger bank account now, an organism can create more or higher quality offspring 
in the future” (p. 242). In other words, mating effort is associated with fast reproduction and 
striving for mating quantity (i.e., sooner and larger number of offspring with less or lower 
quality investment into each offspring), while somatic effort is associated with slow 
reproduction and striving for mating quality (i.e., later and fewer offspring but with higher 
levels of quality investment into each offspring).  
In biological reality, organisms live within finite resource budgets and cannot spend 
more resources than they have available. As a result of this budget constraint, for example, 
time spent gathering food cannot be spent sleeping, metabolic energy allocated toward 
intrasexual competition cannot be allocated toward immune function, and effort spent on 
parenting cannot be spent on acquiring new mates. Against this backdrop, life history theory 
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was developed to explain how organisms, including humans, prioritize their allocation of 
finite resources (e.g., time, energy, etc) across the lifetime according to the pace of 
reproduction they prefer (Charnov, 1993; Stearns, 1992; Baumard & Chevallier, 2015). A 
fundamental trade-off between reproductive versus somatic effort exists, which can be 
conceptualized as a trade-off between spending resources on current or fast versus future or 
slow reproduction (see Figure 2). 
Griskevicius et al. (2011) illustrate these two types of life history strategies by 
comparing the tenrec with the elephant: “The tenrec, a small mammal from Madagascar, 
adopts a fast life history strategy: Tenrecs tend to begin reproducing only a few weeks after 
birth, investing most of their energy in current reproduction and thereby investing little in 
growth and maintenance for future reproduction. Other species, such as elephants, follow a 
slower life history strategy; elephants tend to mature more slowly and wait many years before 
beginning to reproduce. Instead, they invest resources in somatic effort, developing larger 
and higher quality phenotypes, because doing so historically meant leaving more descendents 
than did elephants that did not invest as much into somatic effort” (p. 242). 
The pace or strategy adopted by an organism is calibrated according to variations in 
ecological factors which imply different optimal energy allocation strategies (Kozlowski & 
Weigert, 1987). If the environment signals high likelihood of mortality, opportunities are 
expected to be scarce, which then makes less sense to invest in an uncertain future; instead, it 
will be more profitable in evolutionary terms to discount the future, take more risks to attain 
short-term gains, and aim reproduce as soon or as much as possible while making mate and 
offspring quality less of a priority. Indeed, organisms that evolved or developed in harsh and 
unpredictable environments tend to invest less in somatic effort, sexually mature sooner, start 
finding mates upon reaching sexual maturity, and reproduce quickly (Daan & Tinbergen, 
1997). A fast strategy which makes people less choosy in the face of opportunities is adaptive 
RUNNING HEAD: LIFE HISTORY AND SOCIOMETER MODEL OF SELF-ESTEEM 
30 
 
for organisms living in harsh ecologies because they risk dying from predation or starvation 
without leaving any offspring if they fail to reproduce in time. In contrast, less harsh and 
more predictable ecologies increase the payoffs associated with increased somatic investment 
because they afford their resident organisms more control over their own mortality. Under 
such ecological conditions, a slow strategy that delays current reproduction and mating effort 
while focusing on careful somatic effort increases the likelihood that these organisms will 
survive longer, have high mate value, acquire high quality mates, and produce high quality 
offspring in the future (Stearns, 1992). 
Humans similarly follow this variation in life history strategies. Although humans, 
when compared with other species, generally have a slow strategy characterized by a long 
developmental period, heavy investment in a few offspring, and a long expected life span 
(Kaplan, Hill, Lancaster, & Hurtado, 2000), within-species variation exists as some 
individuals become sexually active earlier and consequently have more children than others 
(Ellis, 2004). Demographers have found robust associations between delayed reproduction, 
such as later marriages and older age at first birth, and various markers of somatic 
investment, such as reduced child mortality, increased literacy of parents and children, higher 
socioeconomic status, and family preferences for fewer children (e.g., Westoff, 1992; 
Engelhardt, & Prskawetz, 2004; Bongaarts, 2002). Multiple studies show that mortality cues 
significantly influence reproductive timing in human populations. A study comparing 
different neighborhoods within Chicago found that the 10 neighborhoods with the highest life 
expectancy had a median age of 27.3 years for mothers giving birth, whereas the median age 
was 22.6 years for the 10 neighborhoods with the lowest life expectancy (Wilson & Daly, 
1997). Similarly, a study that examined the relationship between violent crime and age of 
reproduction across 373 counties in the United States showed that higher violent crime rates 
(but not property crime rates) were associated with earlier ages of reproduction (Griskevicius 
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et al., 2011). A study on the impact of biological father absence, which undermines the 
quality of family environments in the form of related stressors (e.g., divorce, poverty, 
conflictual family relationships, erosion of parental monitoring and control), demonstrated 
that greater exposure to father absence was strongly associated with elevated risk for early 
sexual activity and adolescent pregnancy in girls (Ellis et al., 2003). Lastly, the general 
inverse correlation between income and fertility as well as lifespans within and between 
nations (cf., Weil, 2004) shows that people from poorer environments tend to have shorter 
lifespans and reproduce more compared to people from richer environments. 
An important nuance to the effects of environmental harshness on people’s life history 
strategy is that the preferred pace of reproduction is calibrated specifically during their 
developmental years and may be resistant to environmental changes later. For instance, 
experimental studies show that people’s childhood developmental circumstances (e.g., 
childhood household income and socioeconomic status) but not their current circumstances 
predicted their life history strategy, which can produce different coping reactions in response 
to the same events (e.g., Griskevicius et al., 2013; White et al., 2013). When participants in 
these experiments were primed with the same stressors and threats, those who had better 
childhood developmental circumstances were likely to adopt a “wait and see” approach to 
reduce risk and uncertainty, such as saving money, investing more in studies or career, and 
preferring later reproduction, while those with rougher childhoods were likely to “cash in” on 
risky opportunities, be more impulsive, and prefer earlier reproduction. In other words, 
childhood developmental circumstances shape a person’s strategic approach to life’s 
challenges, and even if he or she relocates to a different location or has a change in 
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socioeconomic status later in life, their life history strategy is more likely to be consistent 
with their childhood environment rather than the current one.1  
In summary, life history theory predicts that individuals who perceive their 
developmental environment as safe and resource-rich are likely to adopt a slow strategy as 
they grow up which focuses on delaying reproduction and investing in somatic pursuits, 
whereas individuals who perceive ostensible cues of danger, instability, or lack of resources 
in the environment they were raised are likely to discount the future and adopt a fast strategy 
that focuses on reproducing sooner. Thus, on average, fast strategists likely prioritize the 
domains and goals associated with short-term gains, sooner reproduction, and high quantity 
mating, whereas slow strategists likely prioritize the domains and goals associated with long-
term gains (in particular somatic efforts to invest in and increase future value of the self), 
later reproduction, and high quality mating. All the major life goals that people may generally 
desire can be meaningfully mapped onto the mating versus somatic effort dichotomy at a 
fundamental level according to life history theory. The proclivity to pursue particular 
strategies over others therefore has significant implications for whether fast (mating) or slow 
(somatic) reproductive goals are prioritized (and likewise their associated domains), and also 
how self-esteem is shaped depending on the successful enactment of preferred life history 
strategies.  
 
4. An integrated model of life history and sociometer on self-esteem 
The evolutionary-based account of self-esteem proposed in this dissertation, which 
integrates life history theory and sociometer theory, argues that people’s self-esteem should 
                                                          
1 From an evolutionary perspective, this fixedness may be due to the fact that the mobility of 
ancestral humans was far more limited relative to modern humans, and thus the chances that 
our evolutionary ancestors would have experienced a change in their surrounding ecology 
were fairly slim. Given that “our modern skulls house a stone age mind” (Cosmides & 
Tooby, 1997), we continue to carry this adaptation that calibrates our optimal strategy 
according to our developmental environment. 
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fluctuate to the extent that the goals deemed as important to the self are achieved, and that the 
importance of these goals is calibrated according to perceptions of environmental harshness 
and stability during their childhood developmental years. As described earlier, a more 
accurate conception of the sociometer should consider self-esteem as a functional system that 
compels people to accomplish adaptive tasks because of the improvements to fitness that 
such accomplishments carry. In addition, because of differences in environmental harshness 
as well as biologically finite resource budgets, people are pressed to select among various 
strategies that prioritize the attainment of either faster or slower reproductive goals. Although 
adaptive goals are likely to produce some amount of fitness gains in general when they are 
accomplished, they are not equally beneficial to all individuals. Which adaptive tasks and 
evolutionary domains a person will consider most important depends on their relevance to the 
pace of reproduction that he or she prefers as a function of his or her developmental 
environment. Thus, life history theory, as a powerful framework concerning how organisms 
allocate their efforts across various life goals, can aid in a useful reconceptualization of the 
domains that underlie the self and offer better predictions of how self-esteem will be affected 
according to domain prioritization.  
Despite its age, Shavelson et al.’s (1976) hierarchical model of the self represents one 
of the most seminal advancements to our understanding of how self-concepts are formed and 
structured. In contrast to other domain-focused researchers who have proposed a variety of 
rather specific domains that people should be sensitive to (e.g., Crocker et al., 2003), 
Shavelson and colleagues did not lay claim to any specific set of domains, but rather used a 
non-exhaustive hypothetical set of domains as an example to make the theoretical point that 
the self-concept is derived from domains of importance, domain-specific outcomes are more 
strongly related to domain-specific facets of the self-concept, domains can be further divided 
into smaller subdomains, and that the evaluation of specific behaviors influences the self 
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depending on the domain category they belong to (Figure 1). Their model illustrates a 
conceptual framework which can be modified flexibly to either include various other domains 
that may be important depending on specific individual difference factors, or reorganize these 
domains according to other theoretical paradigms, such as their evolutionary function. If we 
were to reconsider these self-concept domains through the evolutionary lens adopted for the 
current dissertation, what might the self-concept map look like? 
Evolutionary psychologists have, across various research endeavors, sought to 
ascertain the adaptive domains, motives, and goals that underlie human psychology. For 
instance, Kenrick and colleagues (2002) suggest that there are at least six domains that can be 
recognized as having a unique bearing on human fitness, including affiliation, status, self-
protection, mate search, mate retention, and kin care (see Table 1). Other researchers have 
identified their own set of domains which are more or less similar or related (cf., Kenrick et 
al., 2003; Kenrick et al., 2010; Kruger et al., 2007; Morse, Neel, Todd, & Funder, 2015). 
These domains are argued to be functionally distinct and each comes with its own set of 
adaptive challenges as well as attendant mechanisms that are responsible for tackling them 
(Kenrick et al., 2003; Cosmides & Tooby, 1994). For instance, people have evolved 
psychological mechanisms for competition, but the cues that trigger competition in mating-
related domains, such as the presence of attractive same-sex rivals, differ from those in the 
domains related to status-seeking, such as high-performing peers in school or at work. 
Figure 3 illustrates how the examples of general life domains identified by Shavelson 
and colleagues map onto the evolutionary domains identified by Kenrick et al. (2002) and 
boil down to a somatic versus mating effort dichotomy. As environmental harshness (e.g., 
poverty, violence, crime, etc) increases, the future becomes more uncertain and people are 
more likely to favor immediate over delayed reproduction. Therefore, in terms of the six 
domains proposed by Kenrick et al. (2002), fast strategists are likely to exert mating effort 
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and thus prioritize the mate search and mate retention domains, whereas slow strategists are 
likely to exert somatic effort and thus prioritize the affiliation, status, self-protection, and kin 
care domains. As predicted by sociometer theory, self-esteem should reflect successes or 
failures in domains that are important to the self-concept, and thus compared to slow 
strategists, fast strategists’ self-esteem is more likely to be affected by events and 
circumstances related to the mating domain, such as evaluation by potential mates, their own 
mate value, and the state of their romantic relationships with current mates. In contrast, 
compared to fast strategists, slow strategists’ self-esteem is more likely to be affected by 
events and circumstances that signal successes at somatic effort, such as being accepted into 
social groups, achievement in school or work, and parenting. 
This reorganization of domains according to adaptive function can lead to predictions 
that differ significantly from earlier models of the self. For instance, the significant others and 
peers who, originally according to Shavelson and colleagues, shape the social domain of the 
self-concept are, from an evolutionary perspective, possibly tied instead to the domains of 
mate retention and affiliation. Depending on one’s life history, which determines one’s 
stronger preference for either mating or somatic goals, the evaluation of behaviors, events, 
and circumstances in these two adaptive domains have different implications for self-esteem. 
In contrast to Shavelson and colleagues’ expectation that one’s interpersonal success for both 
significant others and peers will equally influence self-esteem through the social self-concept, 
the life history-driven framework of the self predicts that significant others and peers will 
differentially influence one’s self-esteem depending on whether one is a fast or slow 
strategist, whereby significant others play a greater role for fast strategists’ self-esteem and 
peers play a greater role for slow strategists’ self-esteem. In addition, the evolutionary 
perspective emphasizes the importance of carefully assessing the underlying adaptive purpose 
that a particular effort serves because seemingly similar behavioral efforts can be exerted as 
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means to different functional ends. For instance, both fast and slow strategists may appear to 
strive similarly for social status, but whereas slow strategists may most explicitly do so as 
part of their somatic investment in their own skills and abilities, such as learning and mastery 
(Deci & Ryan, 2000), fast strategists may instead do so because they recognize that having 
high social status equates to being more romantically desirable (Buss, 1989), which facilitates 
mating effort. The mapping proposed in Figure 3 represents but one theoretical way of 
defining the various self subdomains according to Kenrick and colleagues’ set of adaptive 
domains under the life history dichotomy of mating versus somatic effort; other mappings 
arguably exist depending on the adaptive functions that are emphasized, but the basic 
theoretical principle remains the same—that the preferred pace of reproduction determines 
the domains that have greater implications for self-esteem. 
Researchers borrowing from these insights on domain-specificity have provided some 
evidence that the sociometer for mating domains operates independently of the sociometer for 
somatic domains. Kavanagh and colleagues (2010) found that rejection or acceptance by 
members of the opposite sex altered participants’ evaluations of their own mate value which 
was reflected in their mating aspirations (the mating sociometer), and that the causal pathway 
between either rejection or acceptance and mating aspirations was mediated by changes in 
global self-esteem. The impact of rejection or acceptance by members of the opposite sex 
was specific to mating aspirations and did not generalize to levels of aspiration in establishing 
same-sex relations (the social inclusion sociometer), thereby distinguishing the domain-
specificity of the mating sociometer as unique and separate from social inclusion and 
belonging needs.  
Taken together, the integration of sociometer theory and life history theory with self-
esteem simultaneously predicts that the effects of goal accomplishment in particular domains, 
which represents their value in those domains, will affect self-esteem depending on one’s life 
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history. In other words, life history will moderate the effects of domain-specific value and 
achievements on self-esteem (Figure 4). When a domain is prioritized according to life 
history strategy, one’s overall self-esteem is expected to be positively correlated with value in 
that domain. The model immediately offers at least three major specific predictions. First, the 
more that threats to survival exist in the environment in which an individual grows, the more 
that reproduction will be preferred sooner, and the more that the mating domains and their 
associated goals (e.g., seeking mates, appearing desirable, outcompeting intrasexual rivals, 
having high mate value) will be prioritized and weighted heavily over somatic domains. 
Second, the less that threats to survival exist in an individual’s developmental environment, 
the more that mating quality will be preferred and thus a more patient approach to investing 
in oneself takes precedence over sooner reproduction, and the more that the somatic domains 
and their associated goals (e.g., building coalitions, academic achievement, gaining career 
status) will be prioritized and weighted heavily over mating domains. Third, value in more 
heavily weighted, prioritized domains will have a greater influence on self-esteem than less 
heavily weighted, unprioritized domains.  
 
4.1. Self-biased behaviors from an evolutionary perspective 
A fundamental, evolutionary approach to self-esteem also allows us to reconsider the 
various self-biased behaviors enacted by people that seem geared towards pushing for a view 
of the self that is more positive than warranted. In general, self-esteem researchers have 
argued that people can, in the service of self-esteem maintenance, either persist in exerting 
effort to manage value in important domains through self-enhancing and self-protecting 
behaviors in those domains (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009), or downplay and devalue the 
importance of domains they fare badly in (Major & Schmader, 1998). Although the current 
dissertation departs from the view that there is any self-esteem motive, these self-biased 
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behaviors are still robustly found across various studies (e.g., Kruglanski, 1989; Taylor & 
Brown, 1988; Sedikides, 1993; Sanitioso & Wlodarski, 2004; Ferrari & Tice, 2000; Jones & 
Berglas, 1978; Rhodewalt et al., 1991; Schmader et al., 2001) and thus deserve a proper 
consideration of the adaptive functions that they may serve.  
 
4.1.1. Self-enhancement and self-protection 
Findings abound in the self-esteem literature demonstrating people’s self-biased 
motivations to exaggerate their virtues and to minimize their shortcomings, as well as to 
construe events such that their attributes are placed in the most favorable light (Alicke & 
Govorun, 2005; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). These self-biased motives can be referred to as 
efforts to self-enhance and self-protect. Scholars specializing in people’s motivations to 
enhance and protect positive self-views have argued that “although both self-enhancement 
and self-protection are part of an overarching desire to feel good about the self, there are 
important differences. […] Self-enhancement focuses on attaining, maximizing, and 
regulating positive self-views, whereas self-protection focuses on avoiding, minimizing, and 
repairing negative self-views. It is often difficult to tease apart the two self-motives 
empirically, partly because a given behavior (e.g., self-handicapping) can reflect either self-
enhancement (e.g., maximizing credit for success) or self-protection (e.g., minimizing blame 
for failure)” (Hepper, Gramzow, & Sedikides, 2010; p. 782).  
From an adaptive standpoint, people enact self-enhancing behaviors to maintain 
domain value at a high level, and people do so because many features of our complex social 
world (especially during ancestral times) do not carry objective markers of success. For 
instance, John may be aware based on social inferences that he is popular, but putting aside 
modern inventions such as social media “likes”, there is no objective quantity or true “score” 
that exists which can indicate how high his social value is, nor is there any guarantee that his 
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social value will remain high without sustained effort to maintain his popularity. John must 
therefore persist in propping up his social value or suss out information that can reaffirm it, 
such as joining social gatherings, making the effort to chat with strangers on the street, and 
putting himself in situations that can provide feedback on how well liked he is. Self-
enhancing behaviors are found to be typically associated with high self-esteem (Tice, 1991). 
When assessed with the related literature on approach-avoidance motivation (Elliot & 
Church, 1997) and regulatory focus (Higgins et al., 2001), self-enhancement has been shown 
to overlap substantially with approach motivations and promotion focus, both of which 
emphasize accomplishments rather than safety as well as a greater concern with gains and 
non-gains rather than losses and non-losses (Braverman & Frost, 2012). Indeed, people with 
higher self-worth have greater confidence to approach situations and capitalize on 
opportunities that further reinforce their high self-regard, such as “selecting situations in 
which they are likely to excel, and […] promoting their virtues when there is no fear of 
contradiction” (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; p. 23). Domain self-enhancement is therefore an 
adaptive behavior for people who have high value in the domains they prioritize, and this 
comprises of actions that strive to promote the self in those domains and approach situations 
that can elevate or continue to maintain high domain value. 
In contrast, research shows that self-protection is associated with low self-esteem, and 
people with low domain value in their prioritized domains are likely to enact self-protective 
behaviors to defensively protect and repair domain value (Tice, 1991). Self-protection is 
related to avoidance motivation and having a prevention focus, whereby self-protecting 
individuals engage in “retreating from threatening situations, making excuses designed to 
deflect negative self-implications, misremembering unfavourable information about the self, 
avoiding situations that threaten failure, and evaluating other people and groups unfavourably 
to maintain relatively positive self-views” (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; p. 23). Thus, self-
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protecting individuals are still concerned with performance but are primarily driven to avoid 
losses rather than achieve gains, and have a general desire to prevent the occurrence of 
undesirable outcomes in life domains they consider important (Braverman & Frost, 2012). 
Adaptively, self-protection is a crucial behavior for people with low value in prioritized 
domains because they want to prevent their value from sliding further. For example, if John 
considers mating goals to be important but repeatedly receives feedback that he has low mate 
value (e.g., rejection from potential mates or the inability to attract the attention of the 
opposite sex), John may obsess over covering up his flaws, ensuring that his pickup lines are 
perfect, or being very accommodating to his dates to decrease the chances that he will be 
rejected in future. Importantly, the avoidance motivation of self-protection does not imply 
that people want to avoid the domain altogether when they self-protect. Instead, because the 
domain is important, people want to avoid racking up further losses in the domain, and thus 
will behave more carefully in their approach to domain-relevant situations and compensate to 
buffer against possible further failures. 
 
4.1.2. Devaluing of domains 
Alternatively, some self-esteem researchers have emphasized domain devaluation as a 
means to maintain self-esteem. Domain devaluation is a defensive disengagement of self-
esteem from one’s outcomes in a domain such that self-esteem is not contingent upon one’s 
successes or failures in that domain (Major & Schmader, 1998). For instance, African 
American students face negative cultural stereotypes that portray them as less intelligent than 
students of other ethnic groups, and these are compounded by statistics suggesting that 
African Americans fare more poorly than others in academic achievement (Steele, 1997). 
Although it might be anticipated that such negative stereotypes and academic outcomes 
would pose a self-esteem threat to African American students, on the contrary, research finds 
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that their levels of self-esteem and academic self-concepts are on par with students from other 
ethnic groups (e.g., Crocker & Major, 1989; Graham, 1994). One suggested way that African 
American students cope with academic threats is to disengage their feelings of self-worth 
from their academic outcomes (Major & Schmader, 1998). Therefore, through downplaying 
the importance of particular domains, performance in those domains have less of a bearing on 
self-evaluations, and hence individuals can protect themselves from the threat or harm of low 
value in those domains to their overall self-esteem. 
An unanswered question is why some people persist in exerting effort in poorly 
performing domains while others resort to devaluing those domains. The current life history 
and sociometer model of self-esteem provides a straightforward and clear answer: based on 
the prioritization of either a faster or slower strategy due to developmental circumstances, 
some domains have been calibrated to be adaptively too critical to devalue, and thus 
persistence is the end outcome. In the event that an individual has low value in an important, 
prioritized domain, careful domain-specific self-protective behaviors are likely to occur as he 
or she tries to repair value in that domain. Conversely, when value is low in a domain that is 
considerably unimportant and thus already unprioritized, that domain can be safely unhinged 
from self-worth. Although self-esteem scholars regard such a behavior as geared towards 
preserving positive self-views, an evolutionary perspective regards the motivated devaluation 
of poor performance domains as serving an adaptively functional purpose, specifically the 
optimization of the allocation of effort towards more important domains and goal pursuits. If 
a domain is considered unimportant, feedback denoting low value will lead to a devaluation 
of the domain such that time and energy can be conserved and channelled towards other 
domains carrying greater priority, thereby reducing the likelihood that effort will be wasted 
on unimportant goals. The life history perspective therefore extends the domain devaluation 
and psychological disengagement literature by arguing that not all domains are equally apt to 
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be devalued within the general scope of maintaining self-esteem, while providing an 
important specification on why, in the face of threats to self-worth, some domains will be 
abandoned while others will elicit persistence. 
 
4.2. Summary 
The current work strives to make a theoretical contribution by using a fundamental, 
adaptive perspective to suggest how important, unresolved issues concerning self-esteem 
research might be parsimoniously addressed. To this end, an evolutionary-based model of 
self-esteem was developed which can potentially advance our understanding of self-esteem 
beyond previous approaches, including the functional sociometer perspective, by addressing 
the adaptive nature of self-esteem and self-biased behaviors, and by incorporating life history 
theory to enable predictions about which domains have stronger implications for self-esteem. 
In particular, life history theory was recognized as a way to address what domains should 
affect self-esteem, how domains might be prioritized, and how domain prioritization affects 
the exertion of effort to manage value in those domains. To a large extent, other 
classifications of life domains are also expected to map meaningfully onto the mating versus 
somatic dichotomy. This novel model of self-esteem can potentially unify the current “mini-
theory” approaches that other researchers have taken to tackle the issues in self-esteem 
research. 
 Figure 4 presents the basic interaction predicted by proposed model and Figure 5 
illustrates the model’s overall predictions of the various effects of life history on self-esteem 
and self-biased behaviors. Specifically, the model predicts that childhood developmental 
circumstances influence people’s preferred pace of reproduction such that harsher childhood 
environments produce fast strategists who prioritize the mating domains, while stabler 
childhood environments produce slow strategists who prioritize the somatic domains. Hence, 
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mating goals will have greater implications for fast strategists’ self-esteem whereas somatic 
goals will have greater implications for slow strategists’ self-esteem. Specifically, value in 
the mating domain is expected to have a stronger positive relationship with self-esteem for 
fast strategists than for slow strategists, whereas value in the somatic domain is expected to 
have a stronger positive relationship with self-esteem for slow strategists than for fast 
strategists. 
Efforts by individuals to self-enhance or self-protect in particular domains reflect the 
importance of the domains to those individuals and the mechanism of the sociometer to 
manage value in those domains, although which specific method is used to manage value 
depends on whether domain value is high or low. On average, it is expected that, if the 
domain is prioritized and thus weighted heavily, high value leads to more self-enhancement 
while low value leads to more self-protection. 
If a domain is unprioritized according to life history, low value in that domain will 
lead to a devaluation of the domain such that, as value decreases, so will the perceived 
importance accorded to the domain. 
On average, having high value in a domain that is unprioritized may produce a 
moderate effect on self-esteem, because for self-serving purposes, high value even in 
unimportant domains may still lead to positive feelings about the self. For instance, high self-
esteem fast strategists (i.e., fast strategists with high mate value) who do well academically 
may feel good about themselves with the knowledge that they can excel at school even if they 
don’t take it seriously, insofar as their current mating goals are met. However, fast strategists 
who languish in accomplishing their mating goals are unlikely to give much weight to 
academic achievement, preferring to focus more effort towards self-protection in mating 
instead. Thus, on the whole, strong effects of value in unprioritized domains on self-esteem 
are not anticipated. 
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While the contribution made by this dissertation is primarily intended to be 
theoretical, two empirical studies are offered as an introductory investigation of the model. 
The findings attained through this investigation, although neither extensive nor exhaustive, 
may provide useful insights into the validity of the proposed model and elucidate avenues for 
future studies guided by the model.   
 
5. Overview of studies 
The current dissertation examined the propositions of the integrated life history and 
sociometer model of self-esteem through two survey studies. The first study represented a 
preliminary test of one of the basic propositions of the model that fast strategists, due to their 
prioritization of the mating domain, will have a stronger positive relationship between their 
mate value and self-esteem than slow strategists. 
The second study expanded on Study 1 by including academic achievement in the 
analyses. This enables a further test of the model to determine if the positive relationship 
between academic achievement (which serves as a good exemplification of somatic domain 
value) and self-esteem is stronger for slow strategists than for fast strategists, and to see if the 
findings from Study 1, whereby the positive relationship between mate value and self-esteem 
is stronger for fast strategists than for slow strategists, is replicated. In addition, the 
relationship between self-biased behaviors (self-enhancement, self-protection, and 
devaluation of domains) with domain-specific value was also assessed. 
 
6. Study 1 
Study 1 provides a preliminary test of the basic propositions offered in the integration 
of life history theory and sociometer theory. According to the model in Figure 4, it is 
expected that life history strategy moderates the effects of domain-specific value on global 
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self-esteem. As harsher developmental environments tend to produce fast strategists who, 
compared to slow strategists, are likely to weight mating and reproduction more heavily over 
other domains, it is hypothesized that childhood developmental circumstances will moderate 
the effects of mate value on global self-esteem, such that the positive correlation between 
mate value and global self-esteem will be stronger for people with harsher and less stable 
childhood developmental circumstances relative to people with less harsh and stabler 
childhood developmental circumstances (Figure 6). 
 
6.1. Method 
 
6.1.1. Participants and procedure 
Participants were recruited from a large Singapore university through the subject pool 
system and 135 Singaporean undergraduates participated. Data from 15 participants were 
excluded from the analyses either for incomplete responses to the questionnaire or for having 
exclusively homosexual mate preferences (i.e., they were not attracted to the opposite sex at 
all). The final sample size of 120 was equally comprised of males and females with an 
average age of 22.2 years, and 91.6% were ethnic Chinese. 
Upon arrival at the psychology laboratory, participants were ushered to private 
computer terminals. When all participants within a session had arrived, they were then 
briefed on the objectives of the study using the pretext that the experimenters were generally 
interested in people’s psychological attitudes and life experiences. Participants were given up 
to 30 minutes to complete the questionnaire containing all the measures of interest, and the 
items within each cluster were presented in random order. Within the questionnaire, three 
measures were used to assess participants’ life history (childhood family income, childhood 
family harmony, and quality of relationship with biological parents), followed by measures 
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assessing mate value and global self-esteem. After a participant completed the surveys, he or 
she was debriefed, thanked, and paid S$5 for their participation. 
 
6.1.2. Questionnaire 
Childhood family income. Griskevicius et al. (2011) used childhood family income as 
a proxy for childhood socioeconomic status, and their study found that childhood family 
income predicted people’s life history strategy. Accordingly, for the current study, 
participants were asked to estimate their maternal monthly salary and paternal monthly salary 
when they were between the ages of 6 to 10. Both parents’ monthly earnings were summed to 
form the childhood family income score. 
Subjective childhood family harmony. Participants were asked to recall their 
childhood experiences (from earliest memory to the age of 12) and indicate how harmonious 
their family was during that developmental period using a 5-point scale (1=Not at all 
harmonious; 5=Very harmonious). 
Quality of relationship with biological parents. Participants were asked to rate their 
agreement with two statements pertaining to relationship quality with biological parents taken 
from Figueredo et al.’s (2006) mini-K scale, which was designed to predict people’s life 
history strategy (the mini-K was not used in this study because of known problems with the 
scale as reported by other researchers (cf., Sherman et al., 2013; Dunkel et al., 2015) as well 
as the lack of cross-cultural validity). The statements are “While growing up, I had a close 
and warm relationship with my biological mother” and “While growing up, I had a close and 
warm relationship with my biological father”, and participants responded on a 7-point scale (-
3=Disagree Strongly; +3=Agree Strongly). 
Mating importance. The importance that participants place on mating was used as a 
“manipulation check” to determine if childhood developmental circumstances indeed affect 
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people’s prioritization of mating. This was assessed using an adapted version of Ferris et al.’s 
(2010) 6-item measure, which assessed the importance that people placed on work 
performance to their self-concept. A list of statements representing the mating domain was 
created and sample statements include “Being attached is better than being single” and “I feel 
better about myself when I know I can attract the attention of the opposite sex”. Statements 
from Ferris et al.’s (2010) original measure as well as statements adapted for assessing 
participants’ perceived importance of other social domains to serve as filler items. 
Participants then rated the extent to which they agreed with these statements on a 7-point 
scale (1=Disagree Strongly; 7=Agree Strongly). Responses were averaged into a mating 
importance composite, α = .70 (see Appendix 1). 
Mate value. In accordance with researchers who have examined the mating 
sociometer (e.g., Kavanagh et al., 2010; Kirkpatrick et al., 2002), the 9-item mate value scale 
from Kirkpatrick et al. (2002) was used as a measure of participants’ mate value. Filler items 
from Spivey’s (1990) social value measure were also added. Participants rated the extent to 
which they agree with various statements such as “I receive many compliments from 
members of the opposite sex” and “After I date someone, they often want to date me again” 
on a 7-point scale (1=Disagree Strongly; 7=Agree Strongly). Responses were averaged into a 
mate value composite, α = .89 (see Appendix 2). 
Global self-esteem. Global self-esteem was assessed with the 10-item Rosenberg 
(1965) self-esteem scale, which is the most validated and commonly used measure of self-
esteem (Robins, Hendin, & Trzesniewski, 2001). Participants indicated the extent to which 
they agreed with statements such as “I take a positive attitude toward myself” and “I wish I 
could have more respect for myself” on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 
7 (strongly agree). Responses were averaged into a global self-esteem composite, α = .89 (see 
Appendix 3). 
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6.2. Analysis and Results 
 
6.2.1. Descriptive statistics and zero order correlations 
The descriptive statistics for all the measures used are presented in Table 2 and the 
zero order correlations among all variables are presented in Table 3. A main effect of sex on 
global self-esteem was found whereby the global self-esteem of males (M=5.05, SD=1.0) was 
significantly higher than the global self-esteem of females (M=4.54, SD=.87), t(118)=2.95, 
p=.004, which is consistent with existing research on sex differences in self-esteem (e.g., 
Kling, Hyde, Showers, & Buswell, 1999; Trzesniewski, Donnellan, & Robins, 2013). No 
other demographic effects were found. 
 
6.2.2. Main analyses 
Prior to the interaction analysis, the independent variables were first centered, 
specifically childhood developmental circumstances and mate value. Each variable 
representing the construct of childhood developmental circumstances was individually 
analyzed against mate value. To examine the two-way interaction, centered childhood 
developmental circumstances and centered mate value were entered in the first step of the 
regression analysis, and the two-way interaction terms between these independent variables 
were entered in the second step. The dependent variable was global self-esteem. There was a 
significant interaction between subjective childhood family harmony and mate value on 
global self-esteem, b=-.17, t(116)=-2.39, p=.019; all other measures of childhood 
developmental circumstances did not interact significantly with mate value. 
Subjective childhood family harmony was indeed negatively correlated with mating 
domain weightage, r(118)=-.59, p<.001, such that lower subjective childhood family 
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harmony is associated with more importance accorded to mating. When participant sex was 
added as a covariate, the interaction effect was still significant, b=-.14, t(115)=-1.95, p=.005. 
Simple slopes analysis for the significant interaction between subjective childhood 
family harmony and mate value showed that the mate value of participants with lower 
subjective childhood family harmony was predictive of global self-esteem, b=.54, 
t(116)=4.00, p=.00, while the mate value of participants with higher subjective childhood 
family harmony was not, b=.13, t(116)=1.29, p=.20 (Figure 7). This result is consistent with 
the prediction as illustrated in Figure 5. Hence, based on subjective childhood family 
harmony, the hypothesis was supported as mate value influenced global self-esteem for 
individuals with harsher childhood conditions, but not for individuals with less harsh 
childhood conditions. 
 
6.3. Summary and Discussion 
The results of Study 1 supported the proposed model (see Figure 4), thus providing 
preliminary evidence that childhood developmental circumstances in the form of subjective 
childhood family harmony can influence how adaptive domains are weighted. Because those 
who had more unharmonious childhood family experiences (fast strategists) valued and 
prioritized the mating domain more than those who had more harmonious childhood family 
experiences (slow strategists), the self-esteem of people with less harmonious childhood 
family experiences was more sensitive to mate value than the global self-esteem of people 
with more harmonious childhood family experiences. 
Although promising, some limitations to Study 1 exist. First, Study 1 examined the 
effects of people’s developmental environments on the mating domain only. It was assumed 
that fast strategists would weight the mating domain more heavily while slow strategists 
would prioritize other non-mating domains. However, as the effects of other forms of 
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domain-specific value or accomplishments on self-esteem were not examined, Study 1 cannot 
confirm that slow strategists do indeed prioritize other domains more than mating compared 
to fast strategists. A more comprehensive test should examine the interactive effects of 
developmental circumstances with the mating domain and a non-mating domain that 
represents somatic investment motives.  
Second, contrary to what was found in Griskevicius et al. (2011), childhood family 
income was unrelated to life history strategy in Study 1. This is likely due to the use of a 
sample comprising Singaporean undergraduate students, which is at high risk of range 
restriction. Singaporeans, as a subgroup of the broader cultural group of East Asians, tend to 
exhibit traits associated with having slower strategies, such as low childhood mortality, long 
lifespans, high literacy rates, and low fertility (e.g., Jones, 2007; Retherford & Ogawa, 2006; 
Weil, 2004; Westley, Choe, & Retherford, 2010; Rushton, 1995), and this is further 
compounded by the likelihood that university students have wealthier and more stable family 
backgrounds. Indeed, as shown in Table 2, the sample’s average monthly family income 
during childhood was rather high, and thus the lack of participants who grew up in low 
income families could be a reason why income was not found to be related to life history 
strategy. In addition, although Study 1’s predictions were supported, the findings hinge on 
only a single item, subjective childhood family harmony. Therefore, while these findings are 
promising, a further study assessing a sample that contains greater demographic variation 
with more items assessing participants’ life history and developmental environment will 
provide stronger support.  
Finally, the model offered predictions of the effects of domain-specific value on 
various self-biased behaviors, which was not examined by Study 1. Alongside addressing the 
aforementioned limitations of Study 1, the further study can also assess the validity of the 
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predicted relationships between self-esteem, domain-specific value, and domain-specific self-
biased behaviors. 
 
7. Study 2 
The second study was designed not only to replicate the findings obtained in Study 1 
but also to expand the predictions to cover slow strategists’ preferences more 
comprehensively. If slow strategists prefer delaying reproduction to focus on somatic 
investments, they are thus also likely to prioritize domains that allow them to build on their 
status and abilities more gradually, which may eventually enable them to find higher quality 
mates or raise higher quality offspring later. 
One such somatic investment domain that has been argued to be prioritized by slow 
strategists is the academic domain (Kaplan & Gangestad, 2005). Academic achievement is 
especially ideal for the current investigation because it nicely exemplifies somatic effort—a 
critically important activity that is done for the sake of increasing one’s value ultimately for 
the purpose of reproduction (specifically high quality reproduction). Academic achievement 
is an endeavor that requires long-term effort and conscientiousness such that current efforts 
lead to later payoffs in terms of increased knowledge, skills, and abilities. Such somatic 
increments, while valuable in and of themselves, are also fundamentally important because 
they promote access to more prestigious and better paying occupations. In turn, these can 
boost social status, resource acquisition ability, and future mate value, which can increase 
one’s likelihood of acquiring desirable, high quality mates and raising high quality (but 
fewer) offspring. Indeed, studies have found that people raised in wealthier environments 
tend to pursue a slower trajectory to reproduction by delaying starting a family while valuing 
education and academic achievement (Doyle & Weale, 1994; Weil, 2004), which are 
antithetical to the faster reproductive trajectory of people raised in poorer environments 
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(Griskevicius et al., 2011). Further, the academic domain has been used in other studies that 
have examined self-esteem domains (e.g., Rosenberg et al., 1995; Shavelson et al., 1976; 
Marsh & O’Neill, 1984; Graham, 1994). Study 2 will therefore examine the effects of 
academic achievement in conjunction with mate value on self-esteem, whereby it is expected 
that mate value is more strongly associated with fast strategists’ self-esteem, and academic 
achievement is more strongly associated with slow strategists’ self-esteem. 
In addition, Study 2 will examine the various domain-specific self-biased behaviors, 
as functional processes of adaptive self-esteem to manage domain-specific value. 
Specifically, Study 2 will examine whether domain-specific value is positively correlated 
with domain-specific self-enhancement (i.e., people with high value in a prioritized domain 
are likely to self-enhance in that domain), domain-specific value is negatively correlated with 
domain-specific self-protection (i.e., people with low value in a prioritized domain are likely 
to self-protect in that domain), and domain-specific value is positively correlated with 
perceived importance of the domain (i.e., people with low value in an unprioritized domain 
are likely to devalue that domain). It is not immediately certain whether people with high 
value in an unprioritized domain will self-enhance in that domain, although based on the 
view that people may co-opt success in another domain to increase their overall worth, a 
positive correlation may be expected. 
In summary, Study 2 will examine the theoretical predictions as outlined in Figure 7. 
When a domain is prioritized according to life history strategy, self-esteem is expected to be 
positively correlated with value in that domain. Value in an unprioritized domain may be 
correlated with self-esteem, but this effect is expected to be smaller than the relationship 
between self-esteem and value in a prioritized domain (Figure 8). As domain prioritization 
increases people’s motivation to manage value in those domains, high domain value elicits 
domain-specific self-enhancing behaviors to maintain or increase domain value, while low 
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domain value elicits domain-specific self-protective behaviors to prevent domain value from 
decreasing further and to repair low domain value (Figure 9). In contrast, as there is low 
motivation to manage value in unprioritized domains, low domain value is expected to elicit 
domain devaluation so that effort will not be unnecessarily expended on goals that are not 
deemed crucial to one’s calibrated adaptive strategy. As a result, people are expected to 
downplay the importance of unprioritized domains in which they fare poorly, self-esteem 
levels are maintained, and efforts to repair value will not be exerted (Figure 10). 
 
7.1. Method 
 
7.1.1. Participants and procedure 
Participants for Study 2 were recruited from the United States on Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk) for US$1 (cf., Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). A total of 422 people 
responded to the call for participants. Responses were excluded if they were incomplete, did 
not have unique IP addresses, failed the attention checks embedded in the questionnaire, did 
not submit the completion code, or were provided by individuals who were exclusively 
homosexual. After exclusions, the final sample comprised 218 participants (44% male) 
between the ages of 18 to 35 (M = 24.8, SD = 3.03). 
Upon successfully signing up to participate in the study on MTurk, participants then 
clicked on a link which directed them to the online questionnaire. Participants were briefed 
about the nature of the study, instructed to follow the guidelines carefully (e.g., to take note 
of the attention checks and the completion code), and asked for their consent to participate. 
After participants read the briefing and gave their consent to participate, they completed a 
series of measures where the items within each cluster were presented in random order and 
were debriefed and thanked upon completion. 
RUNNING HEAD: LIFE HISTORY AND SOCIOMETER MODEL OF SELF-ESTEEM 
54 
 
Within the questionnaire, three measures were used to assess participants’ life history, 
namely subjective childhood socioeconomic status, subjective childhood family harmony, 
and childhood family income. Similar measures used in Study 1 for mate value and global 
self-esteem were also employed in Study 2. As Study 2 aims to examine ability within the 
academic domain as a form of somatic domain performance, participants were asked to 
indicate their academic grade point average (GPA). Measures capturing the importance that 
participants placed on the mating and academic domains (i.e., valuation of domains) were 
included in the questionnaire so that domain (de)valuation could be examined. Finally, a set 
of items developed to tap participants’ self-enhancement and self-protection behaviors in 
each domain (i.e., domain-specific self-biased behaviors) were also included. Factor analyses 
were conducted to determine the final set of self-enhancement and self-protection items to be 
used in the analysis of the predictions proposed for Study 2 (see Figures 5, 6, 7, and 8). 
 
7.1.2. Questionnaire 
Subjective childhood socioeconomic status. Following Griskevicius et al. (2011), 
participants rated their agreement with three statements concerning subjective childhood 
socioeconomic status (e.g., “I felt relatively wealthy compared to the other kids in my 
school”) using 7-point scales from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). Responses were 
averaged into a subjective childhood socioeconomic status composite, α = .84 (see Appendix 
4). 
Subjective childhood family harmony. As Study 1 relied only on one item, specifically 
participants’ self-reported perceptions of family harmony during childhood, Study 2 sought to 
improve this measure by combining the item for childhood family harmony with items 
pertaining to participants’ perceptions of their relationship quality with biological parents 
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(taken from Figueredo et al., 2006; see Study 1 of this dissertation). Responses were averaged 
into a subjective childhood family harmony composite, α = .72 (see Appendix 5). 
Childhood family income. Childhood family income has been shown to be predictive 
of life history strategy in other studies (e.g., Griskevicius et al., 2011; White et al., 2013) and 
serves as an objective marker of childhood circumstances than self-reported perceptions. 
Participants indicated their childhood family income using an 8-point scale ranging from 
$15,000 or less (1) to $150,000 or more (8) (see Appendix 6). 
Valuation of domains. To assess whether participants valued or devalued poorly 
performing domains, the scale used in Schmader et al.’s (2001) study on devaluation and 
psychological disengagement was adapted to capture the importance that participants placed 
on the tasks and goals in the mating domain (e.g., “Being in a relationship is a significant part 
of who I am”) and academic domain (e.g., “Doing well on intellectual tasks is very important 
to me”), using 7-point scales from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). Responses were 
averaged into a mating importance composite, α = .70, and academic importance composite, 
α = .86 (see Appendix 7). 
Domain-specific value. Participants were assessed for value in specific domains, or 
how well they fared in the mating and academic domains. Mate value was measured using the 
same mate value scale from Study 1. Responses were averaged into a mate value composite, 
α = .90 (see Appendix 2). Value in the academic domain, or academic performance, was 
assessed by asking participants to provide their current or most recent GPA, which is 
typically scored out of 4. In the event that a participant attended a school that used a different 
academic grading system (e.g., the Cumulative Average Point (CAP) which is scored out of 
5), he or she was instructed to convert the score such that it would be scored out of 4 (e.g., a 
CAP score of 4.5 would be equivalent to a GPA score of 3.6).  
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Global self-esteem. Global self-esteem was measured with the same Rosenberg 
(1965) self-esteem scale used in Study 1. Responses were averaged into a global self-esteem 
composite, α = .93 (see Appendix 3). 
Life satisfaction. Self-esteem and life satisfaction are related under the broader 
construct of subjective well-being, but there are also important conceptual differences 
between them (e.g., Diener & Diener, 1995; Kwan, Bond, & Singelis, 1997). In particular, 
feeling satisfied does not equate to feeling esteemed. Thus, participants’ life satisfaction was 
also assessed to determine if there are differences in the relationships between self-esteem 
factors and life satisfaction factors, and Diener, Emmons, Larsen, and Griffin’s (1985) 5-item 
satisfaction with life scale was used. Sample items include “In most ways, my life is close to 
my ideal” and “So far I have gotten the important things I want in life”, and participants 
responded using 7-point scales from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). Responses 
were averaged into a life satisfaction composite, α = .90 (see Appendix 8). 
Domain-specific self-biased behaviors. Items were developed to capture the self-
biased behaviors expected of low and high self-worth, specifically self-enhancing and self-
protecting behaviors in both the mating and academic domains. To develop these items, the 
literature on behaviors related to self-esteem was consulted, and insights from studies that 
measured self-enhancing and self-protecting behaviors were gleaned. Studies show that self-
enhancement is related to beliefs that the self is better than average (Brown, 2012), 
confidence in one’s worth and abilities (Judge & Bono, 2001), and narcissistic attitudes 
(Campbell et al., 2002). In terms of behavior and motivation, self-enhancement is associated 
with a preference to approach ambiguous situations because they present opportunities that 
can be exploited to promote a positive image of the self (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009). The self-
enhancement items developed therefore comprised components associated with narcissism 
(e.g., believing that the self is better than others; Brown, 2012), approach motivation (e.g., the 
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desire to increase one’s accomplishments; Elliot & Church, 1997), and promotion focus (e.g., 
having a greater regard for potential success rather than failure; Higgins et al., 2001). 
Conversely, self-protection is associated with beliefs that the self fares poorly in relation to 
others (Leary, 2005). Behaviorally, low self-regard is related to defensiveness to prevent the 
view of the self from getting worse and compensatory behaviors to repair damage to self-
worth (e.g., Ferrari & Tice, 2000; Kernis, Grannemann, & Barclay, 1992), as well as 
avoidance of failure and prevention of poor performance (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009). The 
self-protection items developed thus comprised components associated with self-
handicapping (e.g., making excuses for poor performance; Tice & Baumeister, 1990), 
avoidance motivation (e.g., a preoccupation with avoiding losses rather than achieving gains; 
Elliot & Church, 1997), and prevention focus (e.g., following expectations, norms, and rules 
carefully so that mistakes won’t be made; Higgins et al., 2001). Twelve items each for the 
four domain-specific self-biased behaviors were developed, resulting in a total of 48 items, 
and a confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to determine the items that fit a four-factor 
structure. Responses to the finalized items in the revised measure after the confirmatory 
factor analysis were averaged into a mating self-enhancement composite, α = .73, academic 
self-enhancement composite, α = .64, mating self-protection composite, α = .66, and 
academic self-protection composite, α = .79 (see Appendix 9). 
 
7.2. Analysis and Results 
 
7.2.1. Confirmatory factor analysis for domain-specific self-biased behaviors 
Mating self-enhancement, academic self-enhancement, mating self-protection, and 
academic self-protection were theorized to be conceptually distinct variables. Items in the 
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domain-specific self-biased behaviors measure were thus subjected to confirmatory factor 
analyses to determine if they conformed to a four-factor model structure. 
The initial fit indices for the four-factor model implied a poor fit, χ2(1169)=2.38, 
p<.01, CFI=.61, RMSEA=.08. To improve on the model fit, modification indices were 
examined and covariances were added between the error terms within the same factor that 
produced the greatest parameter change. In addition, items with high standardized residual 
covariances and non-significant standardized regression coefficients were removed. A total of 
29 items were removed (7 from the mating self-enhancement subscale, 6 items from the 
academic self-enhancement subscale, 8 items from the mating self-protection subscale, and 8 
items from the academic self-protection subscale). After making the modifications, the final 
measure consisted of 19 items and the fit indices showed a good fit for a four-factor model, 
χ2(144)=1.65, p<.01, CFI=.92, RMSEA=.05. 
The items retained in the finalized 19-item measure of domain-specific self-biased 
behaviors are indicated with ticks in Appendix 9. The finalized items were used for 
subsequent analyses in this study. 
 
7.2.2. Descriptive statistics and zero order correlations 
The descriptive statistics for all the measures used are presented in Table 4. As the 
range of scores for mate value and GPA is not equivalent and therefore not directly 
comparable, a z-standardized transformation was applied to both variables for subsequent 
analyses. Table 5 presents the inter-correlations among variables and reveals some interesting 
observations. 
First, mate value is positively correlated with mating self-enhancement (r=.39, p<.01) 
and importance placed on the mating domain (r=.17, p<.05), while negatively correlated with 
mating self-protection (r=-.19, p<.05), which is consistent with the predictions that higher 
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domain value is related to self-enhancement while lower domain value is related to domain 
devaluation or self-protection. On the other hand, while GPA is similarly positively 
correlated with academic self-enhancement (r=.25, p<.01) and importance placed on the 
academic domain (r=.48, p<.01), GPA is also unexpectedly positively correlated with 
academic self-protection (r=.32, p<.01). This implies that people who generally care about 
academic achievement are likely to consider it important, engage in behaviors that will 
promote achievement while also being careful to prevent failure, and thus subsequently have 
high GPAs. Intriguingly, academic self-enhancement is positively related to mate value 
(r=.18, p<.01) while mating self-enhancement is negatively related to GPA (r=-.21, p<.01), 
suggesting that the motivations or behaviors in particular domains may have consequences 
for performance in other domains. 
Correlations with global self-esteem are mostly consistent with the prediction that 
high self-esteem is associated with self-enhancement while low self-esteem is associated with 
self-protection. Global self-esteem was positively related to mating self-enhancement (r=.29, 
p<.01) and academic self-enhancement (r=.27, p<.01) while negatively related to mating self-
protection (r=-.29, p<.01). However, global self-esteem was unrelated to academic self-
protection (r=-.11, p=.09). Global self-esteem was also positively correlated with life 
satisfaction (r=.63, p<.01). Unsurprisingly, mate value (r=.63, p<.01) and GPA (r=.63, 
p<.01) both positively contributed to global self-esteem, as high value in those domains are 
likely to promote good feelings about oneself. Global self-esteem was also positively 
correlated with subjective childhood family harmony (r=.35, p<.01) but not the other two 
indices of socioeconomic status during childhood (ps>.37), suggesting that childhood wealth 
does not underlie how positively one views the self. 
As expected, the valuation of domains is related to self-biased behaviors such that 
people who placed high importance in a domain also exerted more self-enhancing and self-
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protecting efforts in that domain (ps<.05). People who valued the mating domain highly were 
also likely to exert less academic effort (ps<.01), thus demonstrating the allocation of effort 
away from the domain that is regarded as less important. It is notable that people who valued 
the academic domain highly did not necessarily refrain from mating efforts (ps>.62), which 
indicates that mating goals are not unimportant for people who value the academic domain, 
but are simply prioritized less highly than academic goals. 
Finally, sex was related to self-esteem (r=-.22, p<.01) as per Study 1, but sex was not 
related to life satisfaction (r=-.03, p=.69), suggesting that, on average, even if the sexes share 
similar levels of contentment with life, females still feel less positive about the self than 
males do. Compared to males, females were more concerned with academic achievement 
(r=.21, p<.01) and thus also had better academic performance (r=.29, p<.01). Although the 
sexes did not differ in terms of their academic self-enhancement (r=.06, p=.42), females were 
more likely than males to engage in academic self-protective behaviors (r=.23, p<.01), which 
might indicate greater academic conscientiousness and account for their higher GPA scores. 
Males were more likely than females to self-enhance in mating (r=-.19, p<.01) whereas 
females were more likely to self-protect in mating (r=.17, p<.05). This appears somewhat 
consistent with findings from the literature on sex differences in mating psychology whereby 
men tend to be opportunistic whereas women tend to approach mating situations cautiously 
(e.g., Clark & Hatfield, 1989; Haselton & Buss, 2000). 
Summarily, the basic inter-correlations of variables are consistent to some extent with 
the predictions derived in Study 2. Unexpected relationships revolved primarily around 
variables from the domain-specific self-biased behaviors measure, in particular the academic 
self-protection subscale. These will be addressed in further detail later. 
 
7.2.3. Main analyses 
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The focal point of Study 2 is to determine if people’s life history strategy, as theorized 
to be calibrated by childhood developmental circumstances, moderates the domain-specific 
effects of mate value and GPA on various indices of self-esteem and other self-esteem-related 
outcomes. Using a repeated measures within-subjects design, multiple three-way interaction 
analyses of the main independent variables (childhood developmental circumstances × 
domain × value) were conducted to examine the predictions as shown in Figures 6, 7, and 8. 
All independent variables were centered and continuous variables were dummy coded. The 
interaction effects of each variable representing childhood developmental circumstances 
(subjective childhood socioeconomic status, subjective childhood family harmony, and 
childhood family income) and domain-specific value on global self-esteem, life satisfaction, 
domain importance, and domain-specific self-biased behaviors were tested and the results are 
presented in Table 6. 
None of the three-way interactions were found to be significant, ps>.26. Although the 
main analyses did not appear to support the predictions derived in Study 2, supplementary 
interaction analyses were conducted to further explore the relationships between the 
variables. In each set of supplementary analyses, one factor (either childhood developmental 
circumstances, mate value, or GPA) was removed so that relationships that are otherwise 
rendered too complex and thus obscured by additional factors may be identified. In particular 
for the analysis of the moderating effects of life history on the relationship between domain-
specific value and self-esteem, dropping one domain factor is essentially an analysis of one 
domain factor while controlling for the other domain factor (e.g., dropping GPA from the 
interaction analyses means that the effects of mate value on self-esteem as moderated by 
childhood developmental circumstances can be examined independently of GPA). Further, 
other unexpected patterns of results that are relevant to the themes broached by the current 
dissertation may also be uncovered, which may open avenues for follow up studies. 
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7.2.4. Supplementary analysis 1: childhood developmental circumstances × mate value 
For the first set of supplementary analyses, the academic domain value factor, GPA, 
was removed. The analyses conducted to see if childhood developmental circumstances 
moderate the effects of only mate value on the self-esteem indices of global self-esteem and 
life satisfaction are essentially similar to that of Study 1. In addition, further interaction 
analyses were conducted to determine whether childhood developmental circumstances 
moderate the effects of mate value on mating self-enhancement, mating self-protection, and 
valuation of the mating domain. 
Table 7 presents all analyses of the interaction effects of childhood developmental 
circumstances and mate value. Amongst all the interaction analyses conducted, childhood 
family income moderated the effects of mate value on the valuation of the mating domain, 
b=.06, t(213)=1.82, p=.08, and mating self-protection, b=.08, t(213)=2.12, p=.04. 
Simple slopes analysis for the two-way interaction effect of childhood family income 
and mate value on the importance of the mating domain showed that, with declining mate 
value, people who were raised in richer conditions were likely to devalue the mating domain, 
b=.26, t(213)=2.96, p<.01, while people in poorer conditions, regardless of mate value, did 
not devalue the mating domain, b=.05, t(213)=.60, p=.55 (Figure 11). 
Simple slopes analysis for the two-way interaction effect of childhood family income 
and mate value on mating self-protection showed that, indeed, as slow strategists who were 
raised in richer conditions are apt to devalue the mating domain when their mate value is low, 
slow strategists generally did not expend self-protective efforts in mating, b=-.03, t(213)=-
.34, p=.37. In contrast, fast strategists consistently prioritize the mating domain, and in the 
face of poor mating performance, fast strategists increase their mating self-protective efforts, 
b=-.35, t(213)=-3.44, p<.001 (Figure 12). 
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In sum, Study 1 was not replicated as childhood developmental circumstances failed 
to moderate the effects of mate value on self-esteem, but support was found for the prediction 
that, when faced with mating setbacks and low mate value, fast strategists continue to value 
the mating domain and persist with self-protective efforts, whereas slow strategists devalue 
the mating domain and likely allocate effort elsewhere other than repairing mate value. 
 
7.2.5. Supplementary analysis 2: childhood developmental circumstances × GPA 
For the second set of supplementary analyses, the mating domain value factor, mate 
value, was removed. Similar to Supplementary Analysis 1, analyses of the two-way 
interaction effects of childhood developmental circumstances and GPA on self-esteem and 
academic behavioral outcomes were conducted, and all analyses are presented in Table 8. 
Amongst all the interaction analyses conducted, childhood family income moderated 
the effects of GPA on academic self-enhancement, b=.08, t(213)=1.75, p<.01, and academic 
self-protection, b=.17, t(213)=3.29, p<.01. In addition, subjective childhood family harmony 
moderated the effects of GPA on academic self-protection, b=.22, t(213)=3.11, p<.01, as well 
as the valuation of the academic domain, b=.20, t(213)=2.34, p=.02. 
Simple slopes analysis for the two-way interaction effect of childhood family income 
and GPA on academic self-enhancement showed that, as predicted, the positive correlation 
between GPA and academic self-enhancement was stronger for slow strategists, b=.53, 
t(213)=3.64, p<.01, compared with fast strategists, b=.22, t(213)=2.06, p<.05 (Figure 13). 
Simple slopes analysis for the two-way interaction effect of childhood family income 
and GPA on academic self-protection showed that the positive correlation between GPA and 
academic self-protection was stronger for slow strategists, b=.98, t(213)=5.82, p<.01, 
compared with fast strategists, b=.31, t(213)=2.49, p<.05 (Figure 14). Although it was 
originally predicted that GPA should have a negative correlation with academic self-
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protection rather than a positive correlation, given that the pattern of results for academic 
self-protection was found to be similar to academic self-enhancement as shown in the zero 
order correlations described earlier, it may now be expected that self-enhancement and self-
protection in the academic domain will exhibit similar findings. 
Simple slopes analysis for the two-way interaction effect of subjective childhood 
family harmony and GPA on academic self-protection showed that GPA had a significant 
positive correlation with academic self-protection for slow strategists, b=.39, t(213)=2.76, 
p<.01, but was unrelated to academic self-protection for fast strategists, b=.13, t(213)=1.31, 
p=.19 (Figure 15). In this instance where subjective childhood family harmony was the 
independent variable, GPA had no effect on the behavior of participants who grew up in less 
harmonious families, thus suggesting that fast strategists may not be particularly affected by 
or concerned with their academic performance. 
Simple slopes analysis for the two-way interaction effect of subjective childhood 
family harmony and GPA on the importance of the academic domain showed that the positive 
correlation between GPA and academic importance was stronger for participants who were 
raised in more harmonious familial environments, b=.98, t(213)=5.82, p<.01, compared with 
participants who were raised in less harmonious familial environments, b=.31, t(213)=2.49, 
p<.05 (Figure 16). This finding somewhat runs counter to what was expected as it suggests 
that slow strategists are more likely to devalue the academic domain with decreasing GPA 
than fast strategists, although the difference between their strength of domain devaluation is 
small. 
Although the two-way interaction effect of childhood family income and GPA on 
academic self-enhancement seems to support the prediction that GPA as a form of domain 
value would correlate positively with self-enhancement, especially for slow strategists who 
prioritize the academic domain more than fast strategists, the rest of the results cast some 
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doubt on the validity of the measures associated with the academic domain. These findings 
appear to suggest that academic self-enhancement and academic self-protection reflect 
motivations to do well academically which contribute to better GPA scores, rather than the 
initial reverse prediction that GPA would drive academic self-enhancement or self-protection. 
These will be addressed in further detail later in the discussion. 
 
7.2.6. Supplementary analysis 3: Domain-specific value × Domain-specific self-biased 
behaviors 
As this dissertation attempted to explore and develop a novel set of measures for the 
purpose of assessing domain-specific self-biased behaviors, an examination of the measures’ 
effectiveness in capturing the types of behaviors expected of domain-specific value can allow 
for a better interpretation of the various results found earlier. Additionally, any particular 
subscales of the measure that fail to produce expected results can be identified and improved 
upon in future work. 
The third set of supplementary analyses therefore examined the interaction effect of 
domain-specific value on various domain-specific self-biased behaviors. Through this 
analysis, it can be determined if domain-specific value uniquely predicts the outcomes as 
proposed by Study 2 when independent of life history strategy (for instance, increasing mate 
value should predict increasing mating self-enhancement and decreasing mating self-
protection while having no relationship with academic domain behaviors). The pattern of 
results for the simple slopes analysis should mirror those already found in the zero order 
correlations, but finding significance for the overall interaction effect will serve as a means to 
confirm that these domain-specific self-biased behaviors indeed exert effects on domain-
specific value that are independent of each other. Further, the simple slopes analyses can 
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provide a quick and visually compelling sense of the relative strength of the relationships 
between variables. 
To run the interaction analysis, the life history factor, childhood developmental 
circumstances, was removed, while the type of self-biased behaviors by domain was used as 
an independent variable. Behavioral tendency (i.e., participants’ reported likelihood of 
enacting those behaviors) was used as the dependent variable. The expected pattern of results 
as initially determined from the theoretical review for Study 2 is illustrated in Figure 17, 
although the findings attained from the subsequent analyses so far indicate that the results are 
unlikely to conform to what was initially predicted. 
A significant interaction effect was found, b=.29, p<.01, and Figure 18 illustrates the 
pattern of results after conducting the simple slopes analyses. With childhood developmental 
circumstances excluded, although there some mixed results, some promising effects are also 
apparent. Among the relationships that are consistent with the predictions of Study 2, mate 
value was positively correlated with mating self-enhancement, b=.34, p<.01, and negatively 
correlated with mating self-protection, b=-.21, p<.01, and GPA was positively correlated with 
academic self-enhancement, b=.22, p<.01. The domain-specific self-protective behaviors also 
had null effects with the domain they were expected to be unrelated to. GPA was unrelated to 
mating self-protection, b=-.02, p=.84, and mate value was unrelated to academic self-
protection, b=.10, p=.19. 
One interesting finding that goes against the initial predictions is the stronger positive 
relationship between academic self-protection and GPA, b=.45, p<.01, than that of academic 
self-enhancement and GPA, which signals that people who are more self-protective have a 
competitive edge over people who are more self-enhancing in their studies. Lastly, the 
unexpected results that mate value positively correlates with academic self-enhancement, 
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b=.16, p<.01, and GPA negatively correlates with mating self-enhancement, b=-.22, p<.01, 
which were also discussed in the section on zero order correlations, emerged as well. 
 
7.2.7. Supplementary analysis 4: Interaction effects by sex 
Finally, in light of the sex differences identified in the zero order correlations, 
interactions with sex were examined. Various three-way interactions were conducted to 
determine if sex moderated the interactive effects of childhood developmental circumstances 
and domain-specific value on global self-esteem, life satisfaction, valuation of domains, and 
domain-specific self-biased behaviors, as well as two-way interactions to examine whether 
sex moderated the effects of either childhood developmental circumstances or domain-
specific value on the key dependent variables. Interaction analyses were also conducted to 
assess whether sex moderated the effects of GPA on mate value as well as mate value on 
GPA. None of the interactions were significant, ps>.14. 
 
8. Summary and Discussion 
Study 2 did not elicit any moderating effects of life history strategy on the relationship 
between domain-specific value and self-esteem, and also failed to replicate the results of 
Study 1 where childhood family harmony (or any other proxies for life history strategy) 
moderated the relationship between mate value and self-esteem. Thus, one major component 
of the theoretical underpinnings of this dissertation, specifically the effects of life history 
strategy on self-esteem where Rosenberg’s (1965) global self-esteem scale was used, was 
unsupported. Although at first glance this result seems disheartening, a rich set of findings 
and other insights were also attained from the wide range of analyses conducted in Study 2, 
which may be instructive for future research. 
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Self-esteem aside, Study 2 developed a set of items to measure domain-specific self-
biased behaviors, which are argued to serve the adaptive role of self-esteem as a sociometer. 
Confirmatory factor analyses confirmed the four-factor structure of the finalized 19-item 
measure. Additional analyses of the moderating effects of life history strategy and each 
domain alone (either the mating or academic domain, but not both at the same time) on these 
various behavioral outcomes yielded some interesting findings. First, consistent with Study 
2’s predictions, decreasing mate value was associated with decreasing valuation of mating for 
slow strategists but not for fast strategists, which demonstrates that slow strategists devalue 
mating to downplay the implications of low mate value but fast strategists  prioritize the 
mating domain regardless of mate value. Further, because fast strategists maintain a high 
level of regard for the mating domain, they increase their mating self-protective efforts when 
faced with threats to mate value. Conversely, slow strategists’ mate value has no bearing on 
whether they will expend self-protective effort in mating. No results were found for mating 
self-enhancement, and thus the life history variables did not moderate the effects of mate 
value on mating self-enhancement. 
Second, childhood family harmony and income moderated the effects of GPA on 
academic self-enhancement, academic self-protection, and valuation of the academic domain. 
The interaction effect of childhood family income and GPA on academic self-enhancement 
conformed with the expectation that GPA should have stronger implications for academic 
self-enhancement for slow strategists rather than for fast strategists. However, the pattern of 
results with the other interactions are also unexpectedly similar (i.e., GPA was also positively 
correlated to academic self-protection, which is inconsistent with predictions), and thus, when 
taken together, the overall picture implies a story that is different from the high-value=self-
enhancement versus low-value=self-protection narrative. One possible explanation is that 
although academic self-enhancement and academic self-protection were developed with the 
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intention of making them antithetical to each other, people who do well in school may still 
engage in both behaviors, despite their different underlying motives. For instance, John may 
engage in academic self-protection (regardless of his current academic standing), which is 
driven by wanting to avoid doing poorly in school, being conscientious, and making his work 
as error-free as possible. These will likely increase the odds that John will do well 
academically. As John achieves stellar academic grades, he may also exhibit academic self-
enhancement behaviors, such as being motivated by compliments about his intellect and 
showing off his academic ability. Academic self-enhancement and self-protection may 
therefore be similarly associated with good academic performance. This alternative 
explanation is additionally bolstered by the finding that these same interaction patterns also 
occur for the importance placed on the academic domain, which shows that people who self-
enhance and self-protect in the academic domain typically care a lot about academic 
achievement as well. Taken together, rather than GPA acting as a form of domain-specific 
value or feedback that triggers domain-specific self-biased behaviors, which the theoretical 
model posited by Study 2 is inclined to suggest, academic performance in this case could 
simply be primarily due to whether people are concerned enough with the academic domain 
(valuation of the academic domain was unexpectedly unrelated to any of the life history 
strategy markers). Curiously, these positive relationships between GPA and various academic 
behaviors are stronger for slow strategists compared to fast strategists, including the 
importance placed on the academic domain. This means that poor academic performance is 
especially related to devaluation of the academic domain for slow strategists, but not as much 
for fast strategists. Given the correlational nature of this study, it is not possible to confirm 
the directions of this effect. Perhaps, it might also be the case that when slow strategists 
decide to prioritize academic achievement, they are more likely to also accomplish what they 
prioritize. 
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8.1. Sociometer effects of self-esteem and domain-specific value 
When life history strategy as a moderator was dropped from the analyses on self-
esteem, all subsequent analyses are essentially examinations of self-esteem’s adaptive role as 
a sociometer responding to domain-specific value. The two domain-specific forms of value 
used in Study 2—mate value and GPA—indeed correlated with self-esteem, as did most of 
the domain-specific self-biased behaviors, and some of the effects found were in line with 
predictions. In general, low value, be it in the form of self-esteem, mate value, or GPA, 
tended to induce self-protective behaviors, while high value tended to induce self-enhancing 
behaviors. This pattern of results was especially consistent with predictions for the mating 
domain, whereby mate value was positively correlated with mating self-enhancement and 
negatively correlated with mating self-protection. Almost similarly, self-esteem was 
positively correlated with both mating and academic self-enhancement and negatively 
correlated with mating self-protection, but did not correlate with academic self-protection. 
GPA was indeed positively correlated with academic self-enhancement but, unexpectedly, 
also with academic self-protection. 
These unexpected findings pertaining to the academic self-protection subscale signal 
that the items used for academic self-protection may not capture the self-protection construct 
adequately. A closer look at the finalized items indeed unearths some items that may carry a 
degree of ambiguity or exhibit a ceiling effect. For instance, “I want to avoid doing poorly in 
school” is a statement that most people will likely agree with, and thus may fail to tap on 
individual differences in academic domain value or any other characteristics. This subscale 
should be improved for use in future research on similar topics. 
The pattern of results for participants’ valuation of domains in relation to self-biased 
behaviors was generally consistent with predictions. People who valued a domain highly 
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exerted more self-enhancing and self-protecting efforts in that domain, and thus people who 
valued the mating domain highly were also likely to exert less academic self-enhancement 
and self-protection. Notably, while people who valued the academic domain highly exerted 
more academic self-enhancement and self-protection, they did not necessarily refrain from 
mating efforts, which is consistent with the view that mating goals are only delayed, but 
never deprioritized (Griskevicius et al., 2011; Miller, 2000). 
An interesting unexpected finding is that academic self-enhancement positively 
correlated with mate value whereas mating self-enhancement negatively correlated with 
GPA. One possible implication for this observation is that the motivations or behaviors in 
particular domains may have consequences for performance in other domains. For instance, if 
John has high mate value (e.g., John is generally competent in his abilities, funny, attractive, 
etc.), he might have the confidence to self-enhance in domains unrelated to mating, which 
may contribute further to his current mate value if done right. Some of the items in the 
academic self-enhancement subscale may also be related to high mate value, such as “I am 
motivated and encouraged when others compliment my academic ability.” On the other hand, 
Jim, who is on the Dean’s list, may have got there because he has more motivation to study 
than to “enjoy flirting when given the opportunity.” This shows that the task demands of each 
domain may be distinct in some cases and also overlap in others depending on the motives 
and goals of the domain (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994; Kirkpatrick et al., 2002). 
 
8.2. Effects of sex 
Lastly, some basic sex differences were found. Consistent with previous research, 
females tend to have lower self-esteem than males (Kling et al., 1999; Trzesniewski et al., 
2013), but no sex differences were found for satisfaction with life. Thus, despite similar 
levels of gratitude, fulfilment, or happiness with life, on average, females have lower self-
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regard than males, indicating that self-esteem and life satisfaction, although related as indices 
of subjective well-being, are conceptually distinct (Diener & Diener, 1995). This is also in 
spite of the finding that females had better academic performance than males, and GPA 
scores were positively correlated with self-esteem (i.e., despite the boost that GPA can give 
to self-esteem, females who scored higher than males for GPA did not experience this self-
esteem boost). The sexes did not differ in terms of their academic self-enhancement, but 
females were more likely than males to engage in academic self-protection, which might 
account for their superior academic performance. This is consistent with research 
demonstrating that females are, on average, more self-disciplined than males, which can 
contribute to higher grades earned in school (Duckworth & Seligman, 2006). 
Males were more likely than females to engage in mating self-enhancement whereas 
females were more likely to engage in mating self-protection. Thus, men were more likely 
than women to agree to statements such as “I am motivated by the thought of ‘scoring’ a very 
attractive mate one day” or relishing the opportunity to get to know more members of the 
opposite sex, while women were more likely to agree to statements such as “I try my best to 
conceal or make up my flaws either with cosmetics or dressing well” and worry about how 
they look to potential mates. These are consistent with mating and sex differences research 
showing that men tend to be opportunistic and open to sexual advances whereas women tend 
to approach mating situations cautiously (e.g., Clark & Hatfield, 1989; Haselton & Buss, 
2000). Some of the mating self-enhancement and mating self-protection items may be more 
pertinent to a particular sex, such as a stronger concern for one’s own physical attractiveness 
for women (Buss & Schmitt, 1993). More sex-neutral items should be included into future 
developments of the domain-specific self-biased behaviors measure. 
 
9. General Discussion 
RUNNING HEAD: LIFE HISTORY AND SOCIOMETER MODEL OF SELF-ESTEEM 
73 
 
Self-esteem occupies a central space in psychological research. Despite this esteemed 
position, self-esteem research has increasingly raised more questions than it has answered, at 
one point even leading many astray with the notion that people have a need for self-esteem 
(Swann Jr. et al., 2007; Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996; Baumeister et al., 2003; Scheff & 
Fearon, 2004). Recent self-esteem studies have taken significant strides towards resolving the 
equivocal findings abound in the literature, such as the insight that predictor-outcome 
measures should be matched (Swann Jr. et al., 2007), that domain-specific facets underlie 
self-esteem (Rosenberg et al., 1995), and self-esteem is contingent on factors that are 
important to the self-concept (Ferris et al., 2010). However, these only address the proximal 
aspects of self-esteem, while the lack of a solid, functional theory of self-esteem means that 
these various aspects of self-esteem scholarship, such as the relationship that self-esteem 
should have on various psychological and behavioral outcomes or the domains that should 
underlie self-esteem (as well as what domains should be valued) still remain haphazardly 
developed and disparate. 
In the current dissertation, it was recognized that the various aforementioned 
problems with self-esteem research exist. A large extent of the contribution that this work 
made was therefore theoretical: the evolutionary-based sociometer and life history theories 
were integrated to parsimoniously address these issues and tie together various streams of 
disparate but related research areas, which addressed at least four main issues with self-
esteem—the adaptive nature of self-esteem, domains that underlie self-esteem, the 
prioritization of domains, and when abandonment of effort or exertion (self-biased behaviors) 
will happen—by integrating sociometer theory with life history theory and developing a 
measure to assess various self-biased behaviors. In particular, life history theory was raised as 
a means to address what domains should affect self-esteem and how domains might be 
prioritized, as well as how other classifications of life domains (and goals) should map onto 
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the mating versus somatic effort dichotomy. In short, it was argued that life history should 
calibrate the sociometer to be sensitive to either fast (mating) or slow (somatic) goals, and the 
sociometer should dispense the desire to self-enhance when doing well and self-protect when 
doing poorly in a prioritized domain, while reallocating effort away from poorly performing, 
unprioritized domains by devaluing them.  
While the aim of this dissertation was to make a primarily theoretical contribution, 
two empirical studies were also offered as a preliminary attempt at examining the proposed 
model. Although the empirical studies served more of an introductory rather than extensive or 
exhaustive investigation of the model, some useful insights were gleaned. The preliminary 
findings from Study 1 were promising as they supported the prediction that life history 
strategy as shaped by childhood developmental circumstances moderated the effects of mate 
value on global self-esteem. According to what was theorized in line with the life history 
paradigm, participants who were raised under less harmonious family conditions may 
perceive their environment to be less stable and develop a faster strategy, which is associated 
with prioritizing reproductive and mating goals. Thus, compared to slow strategists who had 
more harmonious family conditions as they grew up, fast strategists were especially sensitive 
to their mate value (assessed in terms of how they felt the opposite sex or potential mates 
evaluated them), as value in the mating domain had stronger implications on the goals 
prioritized by fast strategists. This in turn had a greater effect on fast strategists’ self-esteem 
than slow strategists’ self-esteem. 
Following from Study 1’s findings as well as limitations, Study 2 was designed to test 
the robustness of the integrated model of life history and sociometer theory and extend the 
findings further. Specifically, Study 2 added the academic domain, which has been used and 
examined before in other studies related to self-esteem (e.g., Shavelson et al., 1976) and life 
history (Kaplan & Gangestad, 2005; Doyle & Weale, 1994), to represent a domain that slow 
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strategists would value, and then compared the interactive effects of the three key 
independent variables—childhood developmental circumstances, mate value, and GPA—on 
self-esteem. Further, a domain-specific self-biased measure was developed for Study 2 so that 
different behavioral strategies in response to having either high or low domain value could be 
measured. A confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to determine the final set of items 
representing the subscales for mating self-enhancement, academic self-enhancement, mating 
self-protection, and academic self-protection. The effects of those independent variables were 
also tested on the domain-specific self-biased behaviors and valuation of domains to assess 
either persistence or termination of effort in those domains. 
Study 2 did not manage to replicate the effects of life history strategy and domain-
specific value on self-esteem that were found in Study 1, and also did not find any 
moderating effects of the variables presumably representing life history strategy on the 
relationships between mate value and GPA on self-esteem. In other words, life history effects 
on self-esteem were not found. However, some results that are consistent with predictions 
were found, in particular for the mating domain. When slow strategists have low mate value, 
they were likely to devalue the domain and avoid expending self-protective mating effort. In 
contrast, when fast strategists have low mate value, they were more likely to exert more 
mating self-protective efforts, and how much they valued the mating domain was unrelated to 
their mate value. The predicted effects of value (i.e., high or low worth) on behavior were 
mostly supported, where high value was associated with self-enhancement and low value was 
associated with self-protection. However, academic self-protection was not associated with 
self-esteem, and was also instead associated with having higher academic performance, 
which is contrary to what was expected. 
Further supplementary analyses showed that variables within the academic domain 
were strongly associated such that GPA, academic self-enhancement, academic self-
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protection, and importance of the academic domain were all positively correlated. This 
indicates that being concerned with academic goals, conscientiousness, and academic 
performance are closely linked for the participants in Study 2 and the measure used could not 
distinguish between self-enhancement and self-protection in the academic domain. Life 
history variables (subjective childhood family harmony and childhood family income) had a 
moderating effect on the academic domain such that the relationship between exerting 
academic effort and GPA was greater for slow strategists than for fast strategists. 
Interestingly, people who engaged less in mating self-enhancement did better at school, while 
people who have higher mate value were more likely to self-enhance in the academic domain. 
This indicates that each domain may have both distinct as well as overlapping motives, which 
may be difficult to tease apart especially for survey studies. Finally, some basic sex 
differences were found, but further analyses of participant sex did not significantly affect the 
interactions between variables of interest in this study and were not further explored. 
Another potentially significant contribution from the current work is the development 
of the domain-specific self-biased measure, which comprised of self-enhancement and self-
protection in the mating and academic domains. Prior to this endeavor, the extant literature 
scarcely offered any scales that could be used to assess self-enhancement or self-protection. 
Hepper et al. (2010) developed a measure of self-enhancement which is presented to 
participants as a survey that purportedly asks them about their “patterns of everyday thought 
and behavior” and how often such thoughts cross their mind. Sample items include, 
“Thinking that traits are positive if you have them”, “Associating yourself with people who 
are successful – but not more successful than you”, and “When you do poorly at something or 
get bad grades, thinking it was due to the situation, not your ability”. While this measure is 
aimed at indirectly capturing participants’ tendency to engage in self-enhancement and self-
protection as they innocuously think about their own cognitive processes, the scale items still 
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appear to carry a high risk of social desirability bias. Although attempting to develop a 
measure for use immediately to test a model as complex as that in Study 2 is perhaps 
ambitious, the relevant literature was carefully consulted so that the items developed were as 
theoretically sound as possible. 
In summary, the current work primarily contributed a novel theoretical model of self-
esteem based on evolutionary principles and also provided some preliminary empirical 
findings. Results from Study 1 supported the prediction that fast strategists’ self-esteem 
hinges on mate value, and results from Study 2 supported the prediction that fast strategists 
consistently care about the mating domain and would increase effort to repair low mate value, 
unlike slow strategists who would care less. Study 2 also provided support for sociometer 
theory by showing that self-reported romantically desirable individuals engaged in behaviors 
that could maintain, reaffirm, or increase their desirability, while self-reported romantically 
undesirable individuals engaged in behaviors that sought to avoid being rejected and were 
careful in their approach to potential mates. Taken together, the findings provide some 
support for a model of self-esteem that is driven by life history and sociometer effects. 
 
9.1. Issues, limitations, and further research 
The findings should be interpreted with caution as various issues exist with the study 
design and measures used. First, it is not immediately clear why life history and domain-
specific value effects on self-esteem were found in Study 1 but not Study 2. The result in 
Study 1 might have been found due to Type 1 error, although a sample size of 120 is 
considerably large. Care was taken to consult the relevant literatures on self-esteem and life 
history and the measures employed in this study were taken directly from those used in 
published papers. Indeed, the 10-item Rosenberg (1965) global self-esteem measure is the 
most widely used measure of self-esteem (Robins et al., 2001) and various experiments that 
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examined life history strategy have used scales that tap on people’s childhood socioeconomic 
status as a proxy for their life history strategy (e.g., Griskevicius et al., 2011; White et al., 
2013). The results found with these measures paint a complicated picture. A promising result 
was conjured from Study 1, although the measure that produced this result was a novel single 
item that was created and added to increase the number of measures that could tap on the 
latent life history construct. Income in Study 1 might not have worked because the sample 
was acquired from a Singaporean university, whereby undergraduate students tend to come 
from families with middle to upper levels of socioeconomic status. Thus, range restriction 
from the lack of low income families might have rendered income invalid as a measure for 
Study 1. In Study 2, measures of childhood income were the most promising among all other 
measures of childhood developmental circumstances, although the overall findings are still 
not robust. Nonetheless, the theoretical premises of the life history and sociometer model of 
self-esteem are sound and, given the immense potential of this model for resolving the 
multiple issues present in current self-esteem research, further research on life history, 
domain prioritization, and domain-specific self-esteem is still warranted. 
Both Study 1 and 2 utilized surveys and were correlational in nature. A problem with 
establishing causality is therefore inherent in the current investigation. For instance, although 
it is assumed based on sociometer theory that domain value serves as feedback which induces 
behaviors that promote even higher value or preserve it, it was not possible to determine 
whether domain value caused the self-reported behaviors or whether it was the other way 
around. Although the results for the mating domain panned out nicely, the academic domain 
was more complicated. Academic self-enhancement, academic self-protection, valuation of 
the academic domain, and GPA were all positively correlated, signalling the possibility that 
people who believed in the importance of academic achievement and engaged in 
academically conscientious or achievement-driven behaviors will end up having higher GPA 
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scores. The current study therefore cannot tell whether academic self-protective behaviors 
cause better academic performance or vice versa, and further studies of a correlational nature 
will not be able to resolve this either. Instead, studies that give fast and slow strategists actual 
feedback on academic performance are needed to see how their responses differ. Indeed, 
previous self-esteem studies have experimentally utilized information that threatens how 
participants view themselves, such as manipulating rejection (Bourgeois & Leary, 2001; 
Leary et al. 2003) or priming participants with low self-worth through imagining various 
rejection contexts (Leary et al., 1998). Thus, further research should use experimental 
methods to manipulate evaluative feedback and test the premises of causality in the current 
dissertation. One interesting manipulation that could be employed, in particular to affect mate 
value or tweaked to be relevant to other important domains, is to provide seemingly authentic 
but bogus feedback. In their study of the mating sociometer, Kavanagh et al. (2010) gave 
participants the pretext that a professor had been employed by a commercial dating service as 
a consultant to assess how people use information to decide whom they want to date. 
Participants were then told that they had to evaluate three other participants (confederates) 
and be evaluated, with the opinions collected on evaluation sheets. Participants received 
bogus feedback that was aimed at either raising or hurting their mate value. Likewise, further 
research can simulate the collection of biometric data that would purportedly give “objective” 
information about attractiveness when compared to a database of other people’s data, and 
then provide evaluative feedback that would affect how they feel about themselves. Some 
Institutional Review Boards may have concerns about participants’ well-being after receiving 
such negative feedback, so other types of less directly evaluative feedback are possible as 
well, such as the manipulation of intrasexual competition in the environment (e.g., priming 
the presence of many attractive opposite sex individuals). In addition to dealing with the issue 
of causality, using naturalistic experiments also reduces various biases associated with self-
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reports, such as social desirability bias, and also increases the authenticity of the responses. In 
this context, state self-esteem scales could also be used to capture more fine-grained 
fluctuations and changes in self-esteem (e.g., Molloy, Ram, & Gest, 2011).  
Although the domain-specific self-biased behaviors measure was subjected to a 
confirmatory factor analysis and showed some usefulness as an outcome variable in Study 2, 
it is still rudimentary in its current form. In particular, the academic subscales did not seem to 
effectively distinguish between more promotional versus more defensive approaches to 
academic achievement. More items should be developed that can capture the subcomponents 
of self-enhancement and self-protection better as guided by the approach-avoidance 
motivation and regulatory focus literature. However, as warned by Hepper et al. (2010), it is 
often difficult to tease apart self-enhancement and self-protection as “a given behavior (e.g., 
self-handicapping) can reflect either self-enhancement (e.g., maximizing credit for success) 
or self-protection (e.g., minimizing blame for failure)” (p. 782). Interestingly, differentiation 
of the two self-biased behaviors was successfully achieved for the mating subscales in Study 
2, so this problem of indistinguishability could be an artifact of the domain’s characteristics 
where the distinction between defensive versus promotional approaches are higher or lower. 
On closer scrutiny, tasks that can always benefit from careful approaches and due diligence 
are likely to inherit this distinguishability problem, such as preparing for examinations or a 
job interview. In contrast, activities where being too careful can incur costs are likely to elicit 
a strong distinctiveness between enhancement versus protection strategies, such as making 
friends or traveling. Another related interesting finding in Study 2 is that high mate value 
individuals tended to self-enhance academically, while high GPA individuals exhibited less 
mating self-enhancement. This also suggests that certain domains have goals that can be 
achieved by doing well in other domains, such as mating and possibly other social domains, 
while some domains have goals that are distinct from other domains and require a strict 
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allocation of focus and energy to accomplish attendant tasks. Taken together, these suggest 
interesting avenues for future research in terms of identifying the unique characteristics of 
domains that create such effects. Nonetheless, the development of the domain-specific self-
biased behaviors measure in Study 2 serves as a good start to dealing with the lack of useful 
self-enhancement and self-protection scales in the literature, and future work to improve the 
measure can potentially pay rich dividends. 
Relatedly, further research should also examine other evolutionary domains that can 
represent fast or slow strategic interests. Mate value and academic achievement are but two 
ways through which success in the two major strategies proposed by life history theory are 
gauged. Studies on people’s life history strategies suggest that one major distinction between 
fast and slow strategists is their preference for short-term versus long-term payoffs across 
various activities (e.g., White et al., 2013). Therefore, aside from reproductive goals, fast 
strategists may also prefer activities that carry some degree of impulsivity, such as dangerous 
sports, gambling, or anything that whets the risk appetite. Conversely, slow strategists may 
prefer activities that allow them to invest effort into something over time—raising a child, 
growing a tree, working on a large and intricate painting, investing in a long-term stock—and 
watch it bear fruit later, slowly but surely. Both sets of activities certainly represent gains if 
accomplished successfully, albeit what it takes to achieve success relies on very different 
appreciations of timeframe. Thus, besides simply increasing or improving the subscales for 
the current mating and academic self-biased behaviors, items can be developed for more 
domains so that a wider range of activities, preferences, and outcomes can be tested. Given 
the current study’s inability find results for the slow, somatic domain, further research should 
be conducted to test other possible somatic, long-term oriented goals, such as career motives 
and parenting.  
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Finally, it must be noted that life history theory, though very grand and well-
established within the evolutionary biology literature (and gaining traction in the 
psychological literature), is but one way to describe all the life domains and is arguably also 
subject to some of the criticisms raised in the current work that were levelled against other 
domain-focused self-esteem research efforts. Specifically, other frameworks of domain-
specific self-esteem were criticized in this dissertation for basing their development on 
haphazard, non-evolutionary, and non-fundamental principles, but the selection and 
development of domains is often dependent on the theoretical emphasis preferred and thus 
life history theory cannot, at this point, claim to be above this criticism yet as it was also 
similarly adopted for the purpose of emphasizing a particular theoretical view. In fact, 
through the use of life history theory, all major life domains were condensed under two major 
reproductive strategies, which some readers may criticize as rather narrow. In its defense, its 
adoption was in response to the lack of focus among current approaches on the fundamental 
nature of domains, which has frustratingly led to a multitude of self-important domain 
frameworks and very little theoretical advancement due to the lack of consensus for basic 
standards from which these domain frameworks could be usefully assessed. Biological and 
evolutionary factors are as reasonable starting points to address these issues as all living 
organisms are inescapably subject to the influence of these fundamental factors, thus the 
evolutionarily based framework of life history theory served as a meaningful way to address 
current domain-specific approaches to self-esteem. As the application of life history theory to 
the study of self-esteem is fairly novel, more research must be conducted to establish its 
validity (or perhaps superiority) in predicting outcomes associated with self-esteem. At the 
same time, research on self-esteem should not be closed off to other possible theoretical 
approaches that may fruitfully contribute to our understanding of domain-specific facets of 
self-esteem. 
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9.2. Conclusions 
The current dissertation identified a few issues with the self-esteem literature and 
proposed a novel and theoretically compelling evolutionary approach to resolve those issues. 
The integrated life history and sociometer model of self-esteem developed and tested in the 
current work has the potential to simultaneously resolve a wide range of problems with self-
esteem that still occur until this day. Although the theoretical model only found partial 
support with two non-exhaustive empirical studies, the current dissertation lays the 
groundwork for future research which can prove fruitful.  
The important theoretical contribution of this extension of self-esteem is that an 
incorrect understanding of self-esteem can cause people to adopt detrimental approaches to 
feeling good about the self. For instance, baseless self talk or receiving unwarranted 
compliments can promote narcissism or inauthentic and fragile self-esteem (Baumeister et al., 
2003; Baumeister et al., 2005; Scheff & Fearon, 2004), and also produce toxic behaviors such 
as entitlement and aggression (Baumeister & Boden, 1998). Self-esteem needs to be built 
upon actual accomplishments in life, and as the current dissertation strives to elucidate, self-
esteem should be regarded not as a goal in itself, but instead as an adaptive psychological 
mechanism designed to sensitize us to the things that are important in life and push us 
towards achieving tasks that should be adaptively beneficial to us, such as finding mates or 
achieving higher social status. In addition, not all goals are equally desired by everybody. 
Achievements in a domain can contribute to self-esteem very differently for two people with 
distinct life strategies. A fast strategist who suddenly finds herself pregnant might be excited 
at the prospect of motherhood while a slow strategist in the same situation might feel despair 
that she will not be able to focus on her long-term career plans. The current dissertation 
therefore highlights the importance of understanding what underlies the self-concept and how 
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the self-concept is shaped, and at the time of this writing, there hasn’t been a more 
compelling potential theory available other than life history theory. Taken together, both 
sociometer and life history theories enable us to understand self-esteem from a functional 
perspective, and if we know the ultimate reasons for our thoughts and actions, it is certainly 
easier to know what to do about how we feel and the goals we want.  
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11. Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Hierarchical model of the self (Shavelson et al., 1976). 
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Figure 2: Illustration of behaviors associated with fast and slow life-history strategies 
(Baumard & Chevallier, 2015). 
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Figure 3: Non-exhaustive illustration of the mapping of Kenrick et al.’s (2002) evolutionary 
domains as prioritized by life history onto Shavelson et al.’s (1976) domains underlying the 
self. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Integrated model of life history theory and sociometer theory on global self-esteem. 
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Figure 5: Model of self-esteem and self-biased behaviors predicted by the interaction between 
life history strategy and domain-specific value. 
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Figure 6: Expected two-way interaction outcome of Study 1. 
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Figure 7: Two-way interaction between childhood family harmony and mate value on global 
self-esteem (only solid lines are significant). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Predicted pattern of results for the three-way interaction effect of life history 
strategy and domain-specific value on self-esteem. 
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Figure 9: Predicted pattern of results for the three-way interaction effect of life history 
strategy and domain-specific value on domain-specific self-biased behaviors. 
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Figure 10: Predicted pattern of results for the three-way interaction effect of life history 
strategy and domain-specific value on the importance placed on domains. 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Two-way interaction between childhood family income and mate value on 
importance of the mating domain (only solid lines are significant). 
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Figure 12: Two-way interaction between childhood family income and mate value on mating 
self-protection (only solid lines are significant). 
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Figure 13: Two-way interaction between childhood family income and GPA on academic 
self-enhancement (only solid lines are significant). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Two-way interaction between childhood family income and GPA on academic 
self-protection (only solid lines are significant). 
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Figure 15: Two-way interaction between subjective childhood family harmony and GPA on 
academic self-protection (only solid lines are significant). 
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Figure 16: Two-way interaction between subjective childhood family harmony and GPA on 
importance of academic domain (only solid lines are significant). 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Predicted pattern of results for the interaction between domain-specific value and 
domain-specific self-biased behaviors. 
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Figure 18: Pattern of results for the interaction between domain-specific value and domain-
specific self-biased behaviors (only solid lines are significant). 
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12. Tables 
 
Social domain and 
associated social 
goal 
Outcomes yielding relative utility Outcomes yielding 
relative disutility 
Typical decision biases 
Affiliation 
 
Form and maintain 
cooperative 
alliances 
Proximity to alliance partners 
Sharing resources equally among alliance 
partners 
Social exclusion 
Reciprocity violations 
Propensity to affiliate and conform 
when feeling fearful 
Sensitive cheating detection for 
reciprocity violations. 
Status 
 
Gain and maintain 
social status 
Dominating competitors (relatively more for 
men) 
Basking in reflective glory of group 
members' achievements 
Deference to more powerful others 
Public losses of relative status 
Risky status-yielding activities more 
attractive for young unmated men 
and less attractive for women. 
Self-Protection 
 
Protect oneself and 
valued others from 
threats 
Higher ratio of ingroup to outgroup 
members when threats salient. 
Barriers to outgroup members (e.g., walls, 
locks) 
Being in a numerical minority 
when threat salient 
Presence of threatening outgroup 
members who are male and/or 
large. 
Rapid detection of anger in male 
(versus female) faces 
Enhanced memory of angry outgroup 
male faces. 
Mate Search 
 
Attract desirable 
mates 
For males judging females: Cues to youth, 
health and fertility 
For females judging males: Cues to 
investment as long-term mates, social 
dominance and physical symmetry in short-
term mates. 
Poor health, aging cues, 
assymmetry. 
Conformity and deference to other 
males among potential male mates. 
Males take more risks and resist 
conformity when mating 
opportunities are salient. 
Females are more publicly (but not 
privately) generous under mating 
motivation. 
Mate Retention 
 
Retain and foster 
long-term mating 
Communal sharing with relationship partner, 
rather than equality-based sharing 
Investment in partner's offspring 
Cues to emotional 
infidelity (relatively more salient 
to females judging males) 
Cues to sexual infidelity (relatively 
Attention by women to other 
physically attractive women. 
Attention by men to other socially 
dominant men 
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Social domain and 
associated social 
goal 
Outcomes yielding relative utility Outcomes yielding 
relative disutility 
Typical decision biases 
bonds more salient to males judging 
females 
Kin Care 
 
Invest in offspring 
and genetic relatives 
Benefits to offspring, and to other relatives 
(discounted by degree of relatedness) 
Threats to kin versus non-
genetically related alliance partners 
Perceived favoritism of one's 
parent towards one's siblings 
Grandparental investment highest by 
grandmother in daughter's offspring 
(tracking paternity certainty). 
 
Table 1: Examples of behaviors and decisions associated with more or less utility in six broad social domains, and some decision biases 
associated with each domain (Kenrick et al., 2002). 
 
 
Construct Measure M SD 
Childhood developmental circumstances 
Subjective childhood family harmony 3.65 1.17 
Childhood family income 8583.79 5061.55 
Relationship quality with biological mother 5.25 1.65 
Relationship quality with biological father 4.77 1.77 
Importance of domain Mating importance 4.43 0.94 
Domain value Mate value 4.19 1.00 
Global self-esteem Global self-esteem 4.79 0.96 
 
Table 2: Descriptives of measures for Study 1. 
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Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Sex - 
       
2 Childhood family harmony .10 - 
      
3 Childhood family income -.11 -.13 - 
     
4 Relationship quality with biological mother .14 .68** -.09 - 
    
5 Relationship quality with biological father .14 .62** -.10 .67** - 
   
6 Mating importance -.07 -.59** .02 -.37** -.31** - 
  
7 Mate value -.09 -.13 .19* -.03 -.06 .19* - 
 
8 Global self-esteem -.26** -.02 .11 .10 .14 -.07 .30** - 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 3: Correlations (n=120) for Study 1. 
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Construct Measure M SD 
 
Childhood developmental circumstances 
Subjective childhood socioeconomic status 4.03 1.53 
 Subjective childhood family harmony 4.62 1.62 
 Childhood family income 4.24 1.95 (approximately US$35,001–$50,000 per year) 
Valuation of domains 
Importance of mating domain 3.64 1.00 
 Importance of academic domain 5.50 1.35 
 
Domain-specific value 
Mate value 4.69 1.15 
 GPA 3.41 .50 
 
Self-esteem 
Global self-esteem 4.92 1.27 
 Life satisfaction 4.53 .93 
 
Domain-specific self-biased behaviors 
Mating self-enhancement 4.24 1.09 
 Academic self-enhancement 4.91 .89 
 Mating self-protection 4.20 1.07 
 Academic self-protection 4.58 .67 
  
Table 4: Descriptives of measures for Study 2. 
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Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Sex - 
             2 Subjective childhood socioeconomic status -.03 - 
            3 Subjective childhood family harmony -.14
* .41** - 
           4 Childhood family income .09 .46
** 0.69 - 
          
5 Importance of mating domain .04 -.03 -.02 -.07 - 
         6 Importance of academic domain .21
** -.03 .03 .09 -.30** - 
        7 Mate value (z-scored) -.02 .16
* .20** .07 .17* .12 - 
       8 GPA (z-scored) .29
** .01 -.08 .13 -.17* .48** .04 - 
      
9 Global self-esteem -.22
** .06 .35** .01 .01 .16* .42** .14* - 
     10 Life satisfaction -.03 .17
* .43** .02 .18** .18** .34** .13 .63** - 
    11 Mating self-enhancement -.19
** .13 .21** -.05 .42** .03 .39** -.21** .29** .30** - 
   12 Academic self-enhancement .06 .05 .15
* .04 -.20** .61** .18** .25** .27** .23** .20** - 
  
13 Mating self-protection .17
* .04 .07 -.06 .18* .04 -.19** -.02 -.20** -.12 .22** .11 - 
 14 Academic self-protection .23
** -.05 .01 -.07 -.21** .45** .09 .32** .11 .25** .66** .76** .56** - 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 5: Correlations (n=218) for Study 2. 
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Interaction variables Dependent variables b t(213) p 
Subjective childhood socioeconomic status × Domain × Value 
Global self-esteem 
.05 .06 .41 
Subjective childhood family harmony × Domain × Value .00 .10 .91 
Childhood family income × Domain × Value -.01 -.05 .71 
Subjective childhood socioeconomic status × Domain × Value 
Life satisfaction 
.03 1.02 .34 
Subjective childhood family harmony × Domain × Value -.02 -.31 .74 
Childhood family income × Domain × Value .02 .05 .42 
Subjective childhood socioeconomic status × Domain × Value 
Valuation of domains 
.01 .12 .86 
Subjective childhood family harmony × Domain × Value .05 .83 .47 
Childhood family income × Domain × Value -.04 .08 .47 
Subjective childhood socioeconomic status × Domain × Value 
Domain-specific self-enhancement 
-.02 -.32 .75 
Subjective childhood family harmony × Domain × Value -.05 .09 .58 
Childhood family income × Domain × Value .03 .26 .83 
Subjective childhood socioeconomic status × Domain × Value 
Domain-specific self-protection 
.05 1.09 .26 
Subjective childhood family harmony × Domain × Value -.01 -.22 .86 
Childhood family income × Domain × Value .03 1.01 .36 
 
Table 6: Results of main tests of interaction effects for Study 2. 
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Interaction variables Dependent variables b t(213) p 
Subjective childhood socioeconomic status × Mate value 
Global self-esteem 
.01 .14 .89 
Subjective childhood family harmony × Mate value .03 .93 .35 
Childhood family income × Mate value .00 .11 .91 
Subjective childhood socioeconomic status × Mate value 
Life satisfaction 
-.01 -.2 .84 
Subjective childhood family harmony × Mate value .00 .02 .99 
Childhood family income × Mate value -.02 -.34 .73 
Subjective childhood socioeconomic status × Mate value 
Mating self-enhancement 
.00 .09 .92 
Subjective childhood family harmony × Mate value .01 .26 .79 
Childhood family income × Mate value .03 1.04 .30 
Subjective childhood socioeconomic status × Mate value 
Mating self-protection 
.05 1.11 .27 
Subjective childhood family harmony × Mate value -.01 -.04 .71 
Childhood family income × Mate value .08 2.12 .04 
Subjective childhood socioeconomic status × Mate value 
Importance of mating domain 
-.01 -.20 .84 
Subjective childhood family harmony × Mate value .02 .03 .47 
Childhood family income × Mate value .06 1.82 .08 
 
Table 7: Results of supplementary tests of interaction effects in the mating domain for Study 2. 
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Interaction variables Dependent variables b t(213) p 
Subjective childhood socioeconomic status × GPA 
Global self-esteem 
.13 1.30 .20 
Subjective childhood family harmony × GPA .10 1.25 .21 
Childhood family income × GPA .06 1.00 .32 
Subjective childhood socioeconomic status × GPA 
Life satisfaction 
.03 .24 .81 
Subjective childhood family harmony × GPA .10 1.12 .26 
Childhood family income × GPA .06 .80 .43 
Subjective childhood socioeconomic status × GPA 
Academic self-enhancement 
-.02 -.34 .74 
Subjective childhood family harmony × GPA .05 .81 .41 
Childhood family income × GPA .08 1.75 .08 
Subjective childhood socioeconomic status × GPA 
Academic self-protection 
-.06 -1.03 .30 
Subjective childhood family harmony × GPA .22 3.11 .00 
Childhood family income × GPA .17 3.29 .00 
Subjective childhood socioeconomic status × GPA 
Importance of academic domain 
-.04 .09 .69 
Subjective childhood family harmony × GPA .20 2.34 .02 
Childhood family income × GPA .05 .06 .41 
 
Table 7: Results of supplementary tests of interaction effects in the academic domain for Study 2. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Mating Importance Scale (adapted from Ferris et al., 2010)  
 
1 (Disagree strongly), 2 (Disagree moderately), 3 (Disagree a little), 4 (Neither agree nor 
disagree), 5 (Agree a little), 6 (Agree moderately), 7 (Agree strongly) 
 
1. Being attached is better than being single. 
2. I like being in a relationship.  
3. I feel better about myself when I know I can attract the attention of the opposite sex.  
4. Being admired by the opposite sex gives me a sense of self-respect. 
5. My opinion about myself isn't tied to how the opposite sex thinks about me. (R)  
6. Without a boyfriend/girlfriend, I feel incomplete.  
 
Appendix 2 
 
Mate Value Scale (Kirkpatrick et al., 2002)  
 
1 (Disagree strongly), 2 (Disagree moderately), 3 (Disagree a little), 4 (Neither agree nor 
disagree), 5 (Agree a little), 6 (Agree moderately), 7 (Agree strongly) 
 
1. Members of the opposite sex seem to like me. 
2. I receive many compliments from members of the opposite sex. 
3. Members of the opposite sex that I like tend to like me back. 
4. Members of the opposite sex notice me. 
5. I receive sexual invitations from members of the opposite sex. 
6. After I date someone, they often want to date me again. 
7. I can have as many sexual partners as I choose. 
8. In a social situation, I often find that persons of the opposite sex seem to act as if I’m 
not even there. (R) 
9. Members of the opposite sex find me uninteresting. (R) 
 
Appendix 3 
 
Global Self-esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965)  
 
1 (Disagree strongly), 2 (Disagree moderately), 3 (Disagree a little), 4 (Neither agree nor 
disagree), 5 (Agree a little), 6 (Agree moderately), 7 (Agree strongly) 
 
1. I am able to do things as well as most other people. 
2. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself. 
3. I feel that I have a number of good qualities. 
4. I feel that I'm a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others. 
5. I take a positive attitude toward myself. 
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6. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure. (R) 
7. I feel I do not have much to be proud of. (R) 
8. I certainly feel useless at times. (R) 
9. I wish I could have more respect for myself. (R) 
10. At times I think I am no good at all. (R) 
 
Appendix 4 
 
Childhood Socioeconomic Status (Griskevicius et al., 2011a; 2011b)  
 
1 (Disagree strongly), 2 (Disagree moderately), 3 (Disagree a little), 4 (Neither agree nor 
disagree), 5 (Agree a little), 6 (Agree moderately), 7 (Agree strongly) 
 
1. My family usually had enough money for things when I was growing up. 
2. I grew up in a relatively wealthy neighborhood. 
3. I felt relatively wealthy compared to the other kids in my school. 
 
Appendix 5 
 
Childhood Family Harmony  
 
1 (Disagree strongly), 2 (Disagree moderately), 3 (Disagree a little), 4 (Neither agree nor 
disagree), 5 (Agree a little), 6 (Agree moderately), 7 (Agree strongly) 
 
1. My family was harmonious when I was growing up (from birth to 8 years of age). 
2. While growing up, I had a close and warm relationship with my biological mother. 
3. While growing up, I had a close and warm relationship with my biological father. 
 
Appendix 6 
 
Childhood Family Income (Griskevicius et al., 2011a; 2011b)  
 
What was your household income when you were growing up (from birth to 8 years of age)? 
 
(1) $15,000 or less 
(2) $15,001–$25,000 
(3) $25,001–$35,000 
(4) $35,001–$50,000 
(5) $50,001–$75,000 
(6) $75,001–$100,000 
(7) $100,001–$150,000 
(8) $150,000 or more  
 
Appendix 7 
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Domain-specific valuation (adapted from Schmader et al., 2001) 
 
1 (Disagree strongly), 2 (Disagree moderately), 3 (Disagree a little), 4 (Neither agree nor 
disagree), 5 (Agree a little), 6 (Agree moderately), 7 (Agree strongly) 
 
Importance of mating 
 
1. Being in a relationship is a significant part of who I am. 
2. Being attached is very important to me. 
3. Success at dating is not very important to me. (R) 
4. How I feel about myself isn’t tied to how the opposite sex thinks of me. (R) 
 
Importance of academic achievement 
 
1. Being good at academics is an important part of who I am. 
2. Doing well on intellectual tasks is very important to me. 
3. Academic success is not very valuable to me. (R) 
4. It usually doesn’t matter to me one way or the other how I do in school. (R) 
 
Appendix 8 
 
Satisfaction with Life Scale (Diener et al., 1985) 
 
1 (Disagree strongly), 2 (Disagree moderately), 3 (Disagree a little), 4 (Neither agree nor 
disagree), 5 (Agree a little), 6 (Agree moderately), 7 (Agree strongly) 
 
1. In most ways, my life is close to my ideal.  
2. The conditions of my life are excellent.  
3. I am satisfied with my life. 
4. So far I have gotten the important things I want in life.  
5. If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing. 
 
Appendix 9 
 
Domain-specific Self-biased Behaviors Measure 
 
1 (Disagree strongly), 2 (Disagree moderately), 3 (Disagree a little), 4 (Neither agree nor 
disagree), 5 (Agree a little), 6 (Agree moderately), 7 (Agree strongly) 
 
Mating self-enhancement 
 
Component   Items   
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Narcissism 1. I would make a very good mate.  
 2. I enjoy flirting if given the opportunity. 
 3. I always know how to attract or interest the opposite 
sex. 
 
 4. I am more attractive than other people.  
Approach 5. An important goal in my life is to have a highly 
desirable mate(s) that others will envy. 

 6. I am motivated by the thought of “scoring” a very 
attractive mate some day. 

 7. I will be proud to show off an attractive partner.  
 8. Having a romantic partner will greatly value add to 
my life. 

Promotion 9. I like to meet new people of the opposite sex.   
 10. I relish the opportunity to find unique ways 
to impress people of the opposite sex that I meet, 
sometimes surprising myself with what they find 
interesting about me. 

 11. Regardless of the outcome, I typically enjoy 
my dates. 
 
 12. I'm not bothered about being overly careful with 
how my dates see me. 
 
 
Academic self-enhancement 
 
Component   Items   
Narcissism 1. I am smarter than other people.  
 2. I do not mind showing off my academic ability if I 
get a good chance to do so. 

 3. I always know how to excel at my classes.  
 4. Everybody admires my intellect.  
Approach 5. An important goal in my life is to achieve higher 
grades and performance than my peers. 

 6. I am driven by the thought of demonstrating my 
intellect and competence to others. 
 
 7. I am motivated and encouraged when others 
compliment my academic ability. 

 8. I desire to fully master the craft or work that my 
academic discipline entails.  
 
Promotion 9. I work better when the school assignment guidelines 
are not so rigid and allow room for creativity and 
experimentation. 
  
 10. I'm not too worried about reviewing or checking my 
school work very closely. 

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 11. Regardless of the outcome, I typically enjoy going 
for classes. 

 12. I like being challenged academically, and have had 
my fair share of excelling. 

 
Mating self-protection 
 
Component   Items   
Self-handicapping 1. I am sometimes unlucky when it comes to meeting 
the right person for a romantic relationship. 

 2. I think I have qualities that people would want in a 
mate, but I'm just shy. 
 
 3. My standards for a date are perhaps too high.  
 4. I don't dress up well enough when I go out.  
Avoidance 5. I often ask myself, what if no one wants to date me?   
 6. I worry about the possibility that people will look 
down on my partner if he/she is unimpressive. 
 
 7. I want to avoid remaining single.  
 8. Seeing others in happy relationships when I'm not 
makes me feel terrible. 
 
Prevention 9. I tend to be very careful with how I approach or talk 
to the opposite sex so they don't see me in a negative 
way. 

 10. I try my best to conceal or make up for my flaws 
either with cosmetics or dressing well. 

 11. If there's something I do that tends to impress the 
opposite sex, I will usually rely on that to try and 
create a positive impression. 
 
 12. I often think about whether the opposite sex is 
critical of me or finds me undesirable. 

 
Academic self-protection  
 
Component   Items   
Self-handicapping 1. I am sometimes unlucky when it comes to school 
and grades, such as being grouped with incompetent 
classmates or being tested on the topics I didn't study 
for. 
 
 2. I think my academic ability is good, but I'm just bad 
at examinations. 
 
 3. I have too many other things going on that get in the 
way of my school work. 
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 4. I sometimes cave in to the temptation to go out at 
night before a major examination.  
 
Avoidance 5. I often ask myself, what if I do badly in my course?   
 6. I worry about the possibility that people will look 
down on me if my academic performance is 
mediocre. 
 
 7. I want to avoid doing poorly in school. 
 8. Seeing others do better than me in school makes me 
feel terrible. 
 
Prevention 9. I am conscientious and careful with my work so that 
I can do the best that's expected of me. 

 10. Specific course outlines and instructors' expectations 
are necessary for me to get my assignments done 
well. 

 11. I always try to make my work as accurate and error-
free as possible. 

 12. I often think about whether others view my 
academic achievements as impressive. 
 
 
 
 
